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INTRODUCTION
In non-commercial situations involving the late delivery of
goods, it is often easy to say that post-breach performance by a
breaching seller totally obviates the non-breaching party's dam-
ages. This is exemplified in the following hypothetical: A agrees
to sell a spare bed to B, who plans to put it in his guest room. B
pays A, but A fails to deliver the bed by the agreed upon date. If
A actually does deliver the bed a month later, before B secures
cover, then there is little chance that B would be viewed as hav-
ing been damaged. This scenario is easily understood. It is also
the basis for some courts' initial negative reaction to a non-
breaching commercial plaintiffs effort to recover costs or lost
profits owing to the seller's initial failure to deliver and also
seeking to retain the profits that it made on its subsequent dis-
position of the late-delivered goods.
[Vol.78:131
PROFITS FROM LATE-DELIVERED GOODS
Such a reaction, while perhaps understandable, fails to rec-
ognize both the state of the law and the fact that in the commer-
cial world, given buyers' frequently more critical needs, late de-
livery may not cure all.1 Indeed, viewing the late delivery as
totally obviating the non-breaching party's damages would not
even be appropriate in the above example of the sale of a bed if A
knew that B needed the bed by the specified date, because he
was expecting house guests and, as a result of A's breach, B had
to rent a bed to accommodate his visitors.
Moreover, in some commercial circumstances, the injured
party may have lost volume because of the breach. 2 That the
non-breaching party has actually lost volume is certainly appar-
ent where the non-breaching party is unable to cover and, but for
the breach, the seller would have resold the goods-or manufac-
tured them into finished products and sold them-and would
have still entered into the subsequent transaction, which in-
volved the late-delivered goods. 3 Indeed, to many resellers or
manufacturers, the failure of a supplier to make timely delivery
may result in a lost opportunity that can never be recovered. 4
For example, if a manufacturer with no inventory needs delivery
of twenty tons of aluminum each week to make cars in its fac-
tory, which is operating at full capacity, assuming that cover
were not possible on short notice, a supplier's failure to make de-
livery one week would result in the loss of a week's worth of auto
1 See generally 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.11,
at 802 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing a buyer's damages).
2 See U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (2003) (discussing the basis for recovery for lost volume).
The section, however, "addresses a group of problems that the drafters did not well
formulate or well understand." JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-8, at 275 (5th ed. 2000). Precisely what situations it covers is
"a question of "considerable complexity with no certain answer." Id. at 276.
3 As Professor Farnsworth indicates, "[i]f a recipient is a buyer of goods for re-
sale whose volume is limited by supply because it is exceeded by demand, the re-
cipient may claim to have lost volume if the supplier does not deliver what the con-
tract requires." FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 805-06. This is true in a variety of
other circumstances as well, for example, when the injured party is a manufacturer
who could not replace goods which was the subject of the breached contract or when
a construction company which could have performed two contracts simultaneously
only gets to perform one because of the owner's repudiation. See discussion infra
note 67 and accompanying text.
4 See John Hackley, Note, UCC Section 2-714(1) and the Lost Volume Theory: A
New Remedy for Middlemen?, 77 KY. L.J. 189, 219 (1989) ("[1]n commercial transac-
tions a late delivery can be as damaging as an insufficient delivery or no delivery.").
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production that can never be made up without expanding the ca-
pacity of the factory.5
While a non-breaching party that promptly covers will not
likely have lost volume, this does not mean that it should be pre-
cluded from obtaining cover damages and also retaining the
profit that it made on a subsequent transaction involving late-
delivered goods. Indeed, as discussed below, the law indicates
that in appropriate circumstances even a covering purchaser
must be allowed to retain profits made in any subsequent trans-
action involving the late-delivered goods in order for it to be in
the same position that it would have been in had there not been
any breach. 6 The basic correctness of this conclusion is also
demonstrated in the introduction and by the illustrations set
forth in Part II, particularly by those which indicate that if the
amount that the breaching party would otherwise have to pay
the non-breaching party were reduced by the profits that the in-
jured party made on the transaction involving the late-delivered
goods, for no good reason other than the fact that the plaintiff
made a good deal of profit on a transaction that it would have
entered irrespective of the breach or the late-delivery, the in-
jured party would not be placed in as good a position as it would
have been in had the other party not breached.7
Whether or not a covering buyer, or even one that does not
cover, must disgorge some or all of the proceeds of a subsequent
transaction involving late-delivered goods depends on the same
proof as in the lost volume cases. For example, this would in-
clude proof that, in the absence of the breach, the non-breaching
party would have made both the originally contemplated trans-
action involving the goods, resale or sale of finished good, and
the second transaction that, by happenstance, actually involved
the late-delivered goods.8 While this analysis does lead to the
5 Similarly, if a supplier of specialized headlight assemblies were unable to de-
liver them for a period of time which coincided with a spike in the market for autos,
even if the automobile manufacturer could, upon finally receiving the headlights,
run its factory at full capacity there is a good chance that it will have forever lost
the opportunity to have sold a certain number of cars because they could not be pro-
duced when consumers were ready, willing, and able to buy them.
6 See U.C.C. § 2-305 (stating that "the aggrieved party may be put in as good a
position as if the other party had fully performed").
I See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
8 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.10, at 800 (discussing examples of
breaches that lead to lost volume).
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correct result, as noted below, similar and sometimes identical
results can also be achieved in a less complicated manner simply
by examining the effect of the breach on the covering party's to-
tal cost of goods for the affected transactions.
I. FERTICO: RETENTION BY A COVERING PLAINTIFF OF THE
PROFITS MADE IN TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING THE LATE-
DELIVERED GOODS
One case that tried to tackle headlong the considerably more
difficult of the two scenarios noted above, namely, the issue of
just how, in a commercial context, post-breach performance by
the breaching party should affect the damages recoverable by the
non-breaching party that has effectuated cover, was Fertico Bel-
gium S.A. v. Phosphate Chemicals Export Ass'n.9
In October 1978, Fertico, a Belgian commodity broker, con-
tracted with Phoschem, an American exporter of phosphate fer-
tilizer, for 35,000 tons of fertilizer to be delivered in two lots. 10
As requested, Fertico provided Phoschem with a $1.7 million let-
ter of credit, an amount sufficient to cover full payment for the
initial shipment." The first shipment of 15,000 tons was to be
delivered no later than November 20, 1978, and the remaining
20,000 tons were to be delivered by November 30, 1978.12 Pho-
schem was aware that Fertico needed these shipments by those
dates so that the bulk fertilizer could be bagged and shipped in
sufficient time to satisfy a secondary contract that Fertico had
with Iraq's Agricultural Ministry, Altaweed. 3
Well before the initial delivery date, Phoschem advised Fer-
tico that the fertilizer would not arrive until December 4, 1978,
two weeks late. 14 In response, Fertico informed Phoschem that
the delay would cause "huge problems" with its contract with Al-
9 70 N.Y.2d 76, 510 N.E.2d 334, 517 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1987). As noted both above
and explained further in Part II, if an injured party does not/cannot cover, provided
that it is a volume dealer in goods of the type in question, it presumptively will be
deemed to have "lost volume," in which case it would be entitled to the profits from
transactions foregone due to the failure of its supplier and to retain the profits made
on the subsequent transaction(s) involving the late-delivered goods.
10 Id. at 80, 510 N.E.2d at 335-36, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 466-67.
11 Id., 510 N.E.2d at 336, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
12 Id., 510 N.E.2d at 335, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
13 Id., 510 N.E.2d at 336, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
14 Id., 510 N.E.2d at 336, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
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taweed. 15 Phoschem's impending breach compelled Fertico to
act. On November 15, 1978, so as to avoid breaching its secon-
dary contract with Altaweed, Fertico acquired 35,000 tons of
substitute fertilizer on the open market at a price $700,000
higher than the contract price with Phoschem. 16
The shipment from Phoschem did not arrive in Belgium un-
til December 17, 1978, and was not off-loaded until December 21,
1978.17 Despite Phoschem's breach, Fertico took possession of
the fertilizer.' 8 Fertico believed that it "had no other choice"'19
because prior to Fertico's learning of the breach, Phoschem had
already drawn down the $1.7 million letter of credit that Fertico
had posted. 20 Fertico did, however, cancel the second shipment.21
Fertico stored the 15,000 tons that it had received from Pho-
schem while it sought a buyer for it, and on March 19, 1979, Fer-
tico eventually sold it to another customer, Janssens. 22 Based on
the cost of the fertilizer purchased from Phoschem and the price
at which Fertico sold it to Janssens, Fertico made a profit of
$454,000 on the transaction. 23
Thereafter, Fertico filed suit against Phoschem seeking
$1.25 million in damages due to Phoschem's breach of the
agreement. 24 These damages included the increased cost of
cover, $700,000, and certain consequential damages relating to
increased transportation costs. 25 The jury granted Fertico a ver-
dict of $1.07 million. 26 The Appellate Division vacated the award
and ordered a new trial on damages.27 Fertico appealed this in-
termediate appellate decision to the New York Court of Appeals,
which determined that Fertico was entitled to the increased cost
of cover plus consequential and incidental damages minus ex-
15 Id., 510 N.E.2d at 336, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
16 Id., 510 N.E.2d at 336, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
17 Id., 510 N.E.2d at 336, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
18 Id., 510 N.E.2d at 336, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
19 Id., 510 N.E.2d at 336, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
20 Id., 510 N.E.2d at 336, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
21 Id., 510 N.E.2d at 336, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
22 Id., 510 N.E.2d at 336, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
23 Id., 510 N.E.2d at 336, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
24 Id., 510 N.E.2d at 336, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
25 These costs involved Fertico's having to deliver the fertilizer to Altaweed at
inland points of delivery as opposed to the port of Basrah (an obligation that was
included in Fertico's renegotiated contract with Altaweed). Id., 510 N.E.2d at 336,
517 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
26 Id., 510 N.E.2d at 336, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
27 Id., 510 N.E.2d at 336, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
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penses saved.28 As part of this decision, the Court of Appeals
also concluded that Fertico's damages did not have to be reduced
by the profits that Fertico made on the sale to Janssens.29 That
is, the Court of Appeals analyzed the subsequent sale to Jans-
sens as a transaction that was separate and independent, i.e.,
one that would have been made regardless of any dealings with
or breach by Phoschem. 30 Stated another way, the majority be-
lieved that in the absence of the breach, Fertico, as a dealer in
such goods, would have acquired fertilizer on the open market
and still made the sale to Janssens.31
The court reasoned that "[i]t would be anomalous to con-
clude that had it not been for Phoschem's breach Fertico would
not have continued its trade and upon such reasoning to coun-
terpoise the profits from the ... sale against the damages arising
from Phoschem's breach."32 In doing so, and in also granting
Fertico the increased cost of cover, the court applied U.C.C. sec-
tion 1-103, which directs that the remedies provided in the
U.C.C. be liberally administered so as to put the aggrieved party
in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed.33
In this regard, the court stated that "[hiad [the seller] fully per-
formed, Fertico would have had the benefit of the [sale to Al-
taweed] and, as a trader of fertilizer, the profits from the
Janssens' sale as well."34 In response to a strong dissent, the
majority stated that "[t]he dissent's characterization of the re-
covery by an injured party of damages for a breach of contract as
a 'benefit' is wrong, since that functionally attributes a kind of
28 Id. at 82, 510 N.E.2d at 337, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
29 Id. at 83, 510 N.E.2d at 337-38, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
30 Id., 510 N.E.2d at 337-38, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
31 Id. at 84, 510 N.E.2d at 338, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 469-70.
32 Id. at 83, 510 N.E.2d at 338, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
33 Id. at 84, 510 N.E.2d at 338, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
34 Id., 510 N.E.2d at 338, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 469. In making this conclusion, the
court did not, however, indicate what price Fertico would have had to pay for fertil-
izer to sell to Janssens had there been no breach by Phoschem. Id., 510 N.E.2d at
338, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 469. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, from which
Fertico's appeal was taken, did, however, allude to Fertico's having accepted the
goods "in a rising market." See Fertico Belgium S.A. v. Phosphate Chemicals Export
Ass'n, 120 A.D.2d 401, 404, 501 N.Y.S.2d 867, 870 (1st Dep't 1986). In the absence of
evidence of market prices, however, there is no way to determine how much profit, if
any, Fertico would have made on the sale to Janssens had there been no breach by
Phoschem.
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lien against the independently pursued benefits derived out of
that separate transaction."35
The majority's approach was subsequently criticized in Al-
lied Semi-Conductors Int'l, Ltd. v. Pulsar Components Int'l,
Inc.,36 both in dicta, where the court indicated that Fertico
should be limited to its "exceptional" and "peculiar" facts, 37 and
35 Fertico, 70 N.Y.2d at 85, 510 N.E.2d at 338, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
36 907 F. Supp. 618 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
37 Id. at 631. Allied did not involve profits derived from the disposition of late-
delivered goods. Moreover, the holding is, on one level, far more extreme than the
holding in Fertico in that there is no question that the court's ruling placed Allied in
a far better position than it would have been in had there been no breach. Id. at
631-32.
Allied involved the sale of 50,000 computer chips from Pulsar to Allied at
$10.45 each for subsequent sale to Apple Computer at $11.00. Id. at 621. The chips
in question were in fact delivered to Allied and, subsequently, to Apple. Id. Thereaf-
ter, 35,000 of the chips were found to be defective and were returned from Apple to
Allied and then to Pulsar. Id. Allied obtained replacement chips at a cost of only
$2.835 per chip and thus made a tremendous profit on the 35,000 chips that it ulti-
mately furnished to Apple. Id. at 621-22. In the suit that Allied brought against
Pulsar for the return of the purchase price that it had paid for the defective chips,
Pulsar sought to offset the extra profits that Allied made on the transaction against
the money otherwise payable, i.e., it sought to limit Allied's recovery to only the in-
creased cost Allied incurred, here $0, in securing replacement chips, on the basis
that Allied was entitled only to the "anticipated benefit of its bargain," i.e., the $.55
per chip that it would have made on the resale of the Pulsar chips to Apple. Id. at
629.
At trial before a magistrate judge, it was concluded that no such limitation of
Allied's damages was appropriate. The judge held that "[t]he initial sales transac-
tion is to be treated independently of the cover transaction and any gains made on
such cover will not defeat or diminish the buyer's damages as against the original
seller." 842 F. Supp. 653, 657 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Fertico, 70 N.Y.2d at 84, 510
N.E.2d at 334, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 465). Upon review, the District Court disagreed with
the magistrate regarding the holding in Fertico, stating that "the Fertico decision
does not hold that cover by a buyer to fulfill obligations on a third party contract is a
separate and independent transaction." Allied, 907 F. Supp. at 631. The court cor-
rectly noted that the transaction, which the Fertico majority had concluded to be a
separate and independent one, was Fertico's subsequent sale of the late-delivered
goods to another customer. Id.
Nevertheless, the court concluded Pulsar was not entitled to avail itself of the
fact that Allied had made far more than anticipated as a consequence of the breach.
Id. at 632. The court simply found that the matter fell within the four corners of
U.C.C. section 2-711, which provides that where a seller fails to make delivery or
the buyer rightfully rejects or revokes acceptance of any goods, the buyer may can-
cel and may recover "so much of the [purchase] price as has been paid" plus the in-
creased cost of cover. Id. at 630.
What cases like Allied illustrate is the "majority view" that where there is an
unanticipated benefit that flows from the breach, equity favors the non-breaching
party retaining the benefit. See David Simon & Gerald A. Novack, Limiting the
Buyer's Market Damages to Lost Profits: A Challenge to the Enforceability of Market
PROFITS FROM LATE-DELIVERED GOODS
Contracts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1395, 1397 (1979). Indeed, had the court limited the
return of Allied's purchase price for the defective goods, as Pulsar wanted, Pulsar
would, for no reason other than having breached the contract, benefited in the
amount of nearly a quarter-million dollars. While the non-breaching party should
not be placed in a better position as a result of the breach, see FARNSWORTH, supra
note 1, § 12.8, at 193, there is also the maxim at work, if not cited, in Allied, that
the breaching party should not benefit from its breach. RICHARD A. LORD, WILLIS.
TON ON CONTRACTS § 39.3, at 517 (4th ed. 2000); see also Hughes Communications
Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 578 (Fed. Cl. 1997) (discussing how the
federal government, which had breached its launch service contract with the plain-
tiff, was precluded from taking advantage of the fact that the plaintiff may have
been able to make arrangements to shift the costs it incurred to other customers),
aff'd, 271 F.3d 1060 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The court held that "[t]he breaching party is
the wrongdoer and should not be able to take advantage of such arrangements." Id.
at 581. One commentator has addressed the question of who should reap the benefit
of profits made on a transaction involving late-delivered goods in situations like the
one in Fertico: "Although market conditions might have affected the profit Fertico
would have earned had there been no breach, it is more desirable to allow the ag-
grieved party to retain approximately the same profit it would have earned absent a
breach, rather than to allow the breaching party to recover it." Hackley, supra note 4,
at 200 n.82 (emphasis added). One can argue that this is what the Fertico majority
tried to do. This appears, however, to be a far better description of what the court
did in Aluminum Distributors, Inc. v. Gulf Aluminum Rolling Mill Co., No. 87 C
6477, 1989 WL 157515 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 1989), discussed in Section IV.
The holding in Allied stands in stark contrast to the conclusion reached by the
court in Allied Canners & Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing Co., 209 Cal. Rptr. 60 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984), in which a seller breached its contract to provide raisins that the
buyer/middleman intended to resell and for which it had already contracted. Id. at
60-61. The resale would have resulted in a profit of $4462.50. Id. at 61. The
buyer/middleman did not cover, perhaps due to the fact that the market price of rai-
sins had tripled. Id. Rather, pursuant to U.C.C. section 2-713, it sought the differ-
ence between its market price of raisins at the time of the breach and the price at
which it had contracted for the raisins, i.e., $150,281.25. Id. at 62. As provided for in
U.C.C. section 1-106(1), the court denied such recovery on the basis that it would
put the plaintiff in a substantially better position than it would have been in had
the original contract not been breached. Id. at 66. In applying this limitation, the
court stated three conditions that must be met before it would be applied: (1) the
seller knows that the buyer had a resale contract, (2) the buyer/middleman is not
able to show that it would be liable for breach of its re-sale contract, and (3) there
has been no finding of bad faith on the part of the seller. Id. As stated in KGM Har-
vesting Co. v. Fresh Network, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 286 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), "[t]he result
in Allied Canners seems to have derived in large part from the court's finding that
Victor had not acted in bad faith in breaching the contract," a focus which the KGM
court believed to be inappropriate in a commercial case. Id. at 292. Allied Canners is
discussed at some length both by Hackley supra note 4, at 206 and WHITE & SUM-
MERS, supra note 2, § 6-4, at 319, with the latter also discussing the impact of inter-
esting permutation of the facts, e.g., the effect of the buyer's breach settlement with
its resale purchaser. Id. at 320. The limitation noted above would not make sense
where the buyer/middleman did not have a specific resale contract, because, as the
seller knew, it was always reselling such goods (or using them to manufacture fin-
ished products for sale) at whatever the market price was at the time of such resale,
etc. See generally id. at 302 n.30. In such instances, there is not any inherent
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by commentators cited by the court.3 In the latter regard, these
commentators opined that Fertico had been overly compensated
because:
The Code contemplates that the buyer will make a choice-
either accept or reject the goods. The solution reached by the
[Fertico] majority allows the buyer to have it both ways-profit
as if the goods were accepted, and damages as if the goods had
been rejected. The fault lies in treating the goods as accepted
goods and then using the cover measure of damages as a test of
the loss suffered. The [Fertico] majority's solution puts the
buyer in a better position than the buyer would have been in
had the contract been performed. This result is not warranted
either under the generous remedies policy of the Code or by the
scheme of remedies it provides. 39
The view that Fertico's acceptance of the goods automati-
cally extinguished its right to the profits on their resale is not,
however, held by a majority of authorities.40 As Professors White
and Summers and the Restatement indicate, whether the Fertico
approach is appropriate does not turn on the reasonableness of
the late acceptance; rather it turns on whether or not the non-
breaching party regularly dealt with the type of goods in ques-
tion.41 They point out that if, as the majority assumed in Fertico,
Phoschem had performed and Fertico, as a regular dealer in
phosphate, would have made both its sale to Altaweed and its
sale to Janssens, then the Fertico majority would be correct.42
They also point out that if, as the Fertico dissent indicated, it
was likely that had Phoschem not breached and Fertico, as a
thought of limiting damages to whatever profits the buyer/middleman anticipated,
because no such amount was firm on the date of the breach. See generally id.
38 See Allied, 907 F. Supp. at 631-32.
39 907 F. Supp. at 631 (citing Samuel J. M. Donnelly & Mary Ann Donnelly,
Commercial Law, 39 SYRACUSE. L. REV. 159, 183 (1988)) (alteration in original).
This view was iterated somewhat by Hackley, supra note 4, at 219, although Hack-
ley did recognize that where acceptance of the late-delivered goods was reasonable
the Fertico approach should be applied. Id. at 222-25.
40 The correctness of the majority view and the basic Fertico approach is further
demonstrated at Part III in the Case 1 (Stable Markets) illustrations. Those illus-
trations demonstrate that offsetting the injured party's damages by the profit that it
made on the subsequent transaction involving the late-delivered goods runs con-
trary to the goal of putting the non-breaching party in the same position it would
have been absent breach. This unduly benefits the breaching party.
41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. f (1981); WHITE & SUM-
MERS, supra note 2, § 6-3, at 298-300.
42 § 347 cmt. f; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 6-3, at 298.
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company that did not regularly deal in phosphate, would not
have made the subsequent sale to Janssens, then "the dissent
[would be] correct."43 This conclusion is entirely consistent with
the citation to Corbin contained in Fertico that "[g]ains made by
the injured party on other transactions after the breach are
never to be deducted from the damages that are otherwise recov-
erable, unless such gains could not have been made, had there
been no breach."44 It is also totally in accord with the view set
out in the comments to Section 347 of the Restatement that "[i]f
the injured party could and would have entered into the subse-
quent contract, even if the [first] contract had not been broken,
and could have had the benefit of both, he can be said to have
'lost volume' and the subsequent transaction is not a substitute
for the broken contract."45
As these citations indicate, the basic lost volume test-
whether, in the absence of the breach the injured party would
have made both the originally contemplated transaction and the
subsequent one which actually involved the late-delivered
goods-applies both in the situation like Fertico where cover was
effectuated and there is no loss of volume and in the situation
where, due to a lack of cover, volume was in fact lost. For this
reason, a better way of summarizing this general rule would be
to say that in the case of late delivery, absent more, a non-
breaching party is entitled to its normal breach damages without
reduction for the profit, if any, that was made on any subsequent
transaction involving the late-delivered goods. This is only true
if, in the absence of the breach, the injured party could and
would have entered into that subsequent transaction.46
43 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 6-3, at 298.
44 Fertico Belgium S.A. v. Phosphate Chemical Export Ass'n, Inc., 70 N.Y.2d 76,
84, 510 N.E.2d 334, 338, 517 N.Y.S.2d 465, 469 (1987) (citing 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 1041, at 256).
45 § 347 cmt. f, accord, FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.11, at 226. Whether or
not the subsequent transaction is a substitute for the one that would have been ac-
complished with the contracted goods is critical because reduction of loss through a
favorable substitute transaction generally results in a smaller recovery by the in-
jured party. See Lasalle Talman Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 317 F.3d 1363, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2003). For example, if unique goods which were the subject of the contract
that was breached were going to be sold for $50, but because of the breach and late
delivery, they were sold for $75, the non-breaching party's increased profit on the
substitute transaction could be used to reduce any damages incurred as result of the
breach.
46 So stated, the general rule would be applicable both to an injured party that
was unable to engage in the originally contemplated transaction because of the
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Even though correct as a basic premise, the general rule
stated immediately above is, however, only one path to a correct
analysis and result. Another is an outgrowth of the outcome in
Fertico having been questioned on the facially plausible basis
that all that occurred there was that contracted goods, originally
targeted to go to Altaweed, simply went to Janssens and the
goods that would otherwise have gone to Janssens simply went
to Altaweed.47 As this analysis goes, it is also reasoned that de-
spite the breach, Fertico likely made just as much money as it
would have had there been no breach 48 and that the "award of
cover damages in addition to the retained profit represents a
windfall."49 This latter conclusion is, however, premised on the
assumption that the wholesale price that Fertico paid for the fer-
tilizer actually shipped to Altaweed was the same as the whole-
sale price at which Fertico would, absent the breach, have pur-
chased the fertilizer that it would have shipped to Janssens. 50
While the above analysis has an appealing symmetry and
seems to make common sense, those characteristics mask a very
basic point which calls the analysis into question. That is, it is
extremely unlikely that the fertilizer that Fertico purchased
breach and the inability to cover and, to a party like Fertico, that promptly effectu-
ated cover and thus did not lose any volume.
Although the above rule was applied in Fertico and its progeny, most notably
Aluminum Distributors, Inc. v. Gulf Aluminum Rolling Mill Co., No. 87 C 6477,
1989 WL 157515 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 1989), it is not, however, applicable to every
commercial situation where there is a late delivery. Id. For example, application is
inappropriate where the non-breaching party was unreasonable in securing cover,
i.e., where there was insufficient reason for it to believe that the goods would not
have been delivered in sufficient time to use in the transaction intended. A plaintiff
facing such a situation might be well advised to seek adequate assurance of per-
formance under U.C.C. section 2-609 if that is possible. Armed with a failure by the
seller to provide such adequate assurance, the reasonableness of the non-breaching
party's obtaining cover will generally be increased. Absent this limitation a buyer
would have a financial incentive to secure "cover" for the most minor of delays
where no cover was required. Conversely, the Fertico/Aluminum Distributors thesis
should certainly be applied even in circumstances involving only short delays, where
there was an actual loss of volume, i.e., where due to the breach and an inability to
cover the non-breaching party was not able to engage in the initial transaction that
it had planned. In this regard, just as with securing cover at an extremely high
price, it is wholly unlikely that a buyer would choose not to enter into a profitable
transaction, even if only marginally profitable, "in reliance upon the outcome of an
always uncertain law suit." WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 6-3, at 302.
47 Hackley, supra note 4, at 220-21.
48 Id. at 221.
49 Id. at 222.
50 Id. at 220-21.
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upon hearing of Phoschem's impending breach would ever have
been purchased for the transaction with Janssens. There would
have been absolutely no need for Fertico to have gone into the
spot market in November and ostensibly pay a premium for im-
mediately deliverable fertilizer, when delivery to Janssens would
not take place until March or April. Moreover, if, as is very
likely the case, Fertico had to pay more for fertilizer on the spot
market than it would have had to in the general wholesale mar-
ket, even under the above analysis, it would be entitled to that
extra cost as well as being entitled to retain the profits derived
from the late-delivered goods.5'
While the normal measure of cover, set out in U.C.C. section
2-712(2), is the cost of cover less the contract price plus any inci-
dental 52 and consequential damages minus expenses saved, 53 the
real concern raised by the above analysis is whether Fertico's to-
tal cost of raw materials for the Altaweed and Janssens transac-
tions increased because of the breach. Simply stated, did the
breach put Fertico in a position economically worse than the one
it would have enjoyed in the absence of the breach? As the
analysis properly indicates, determining if this is the case need
not be based on the anomalous application of the lost volume
rules to a party that did not lose volume. Rather, damages can
be determined simply by comparing the actual total cost that
was incurred for fertilizer to accomplish the two affected trans-
actions, the sales to Altaweed and Janssens, to the total cost that
it should have incurred for the fertilizer in the absence of the
breach. Since the fixed-price cost of goods under the original
contract is contained both in the total actual costs for the fertil-
izer and the total that Fertico should have spent for the fertil-
izer, that item can be factored out of the comparison, leaving
only a comparison between the price at which cover was obtained
and the wholesale price of goods at the time that Fertico would
have entered the market to purchase fertilizer for delivery to
Janssens. Accordingly, the extent to which the cost of cover ex-
ceeded the wholesale market price at the time that Fertico would
have entered the market to purchase fertilizer for delivery to
51 See infra Part III.A.
52 Fertico's cost of storing the fertilizer it received from Phoschem until it was
shipped to Janssens would be such an incidental damage. See U.C.C. § 2-715(1)
(2003).
53 Id. § 2-715(2).
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Janssens is the amount due Fertico from Phoschem. 54 The court
in Fertico did not indicate anything specific about the price of
fertilizer after Phoschem's breach.55 Accordingly, it is impossible
to know if Fertico was overly compensated or under compensated
pursuant to what, for want of a better term, shall be referred to
herein as the simplified cover formula.
As discussed in the ensuing sections, the courts and com-
mentators have attempted and, in round about ways, have suc-
ceeded, at least in part, in refining the Fertico thesis to avoid
overcompensation. The route to achieving that goal, however, is
often a complicated one.
II. REGULAR DEALERS AND THEIR NEED To PROVE THAT THE
SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED
IRRESPECTIVE OF THE BREACH
The question in Fertico of whether, in the absence of a
breach by Phoschem, Fertico would have made both the sale to
Altaweed and the sale to Janssens, is at the center of the contro-
versy that surrounds the case. While a similar question is cer-
tainly central in all cases involving cover and the injured party's
retention of the profits flowing from the late-delivered goods,
other courts have achieved comparable results in a less contro-
versial manner than did the court in Fertico. Notable in this re-
gard is Aluminum Distributors, Inc. v. Gulf Aluminum Rolling
Mill Co.,56 a suit brought by another middleman against a sup-
plier, Gulf Aluminum Rolling Mill Company (GARMCO), for
breach of contract.57 GARMCO had agreed to sell Aluminum
Distributors, Inc. (ADI) a specified quantity of aluminum; how-
ever, it delivered the goods late. 58 As a result, ADI was forced to
54 If any substantial time had elapsed between these two times, the wholesale
market price at the time that Fertico would have entered the market to purchase
fertilizer for delivery to Janssens would have had to been discounted to take into
account the fact that Fertico did not have the use of the money used to purchase the
fertilizer which ostensibly would otherwise have been delivered to Janssens. This
would have been an additional cost that Fertico incurred for fertilizer necessary to
accomplish the two affected transactions.
In this regard, under the simplified cover formula, Fertico would, of course, also
have been entitled to any incidental or consequential damages caused by the breach.
55 See Fertico Belgium S.A. v. Phosphate Chemical Export Ass'n, Inc., 70
N.Y.2d 76, 80-82, 510 N.E.2d 334, 335-37, 517 N.Y.S.2d 465, 466-68 (1987).
56 No. 87-C6477, 1989 WL 157515 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 1989).
57 Id. at *1.
58 Id. at *3-4.
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cover in order to fulfill its obligations under several resale con-
tracts and to forego the ones for which it could not obtain cover. 59
Under the circumstances, GARMCO argued that ADI was not
entitled to cover damages because it had accepted the aluminum
or, alternatively, that it should be permitted to offset the profits
ADI had made upon its resale of the late-delivered aluminum
against ADI's cover damages.60  The court largely rejected
GARMCO's argument. 61 The reason for this is fairly clear from a
reading of the case-the court saw that ADI, as a volume dealer
in aluminum, would still have made both the original sales and
the subsequent ones that involved the late-delivered aluminum
from GARMCO irrespective of the breach. 62 To better under-
stand the court's conclusion, one needs to examine the lost vol-
ume cases and the rationale that underlies them.
By far the most often discussed of the various lost volume
situations is that of the lost volume seller whose customer
breached its contract to purchase. This situation can be exempli-
fied as follows: Buyer X agrees to purchase a new automobile
from an auto-dealership for $20,000. The dealership's cost for
the car is $18,000. Therefore, the dealer stands to make $2000.
The model in question is one that is in demand, but the dealer-
ship can obtain additional cars through alternative means.
Buyer X repudiates the contract. A few days thereafter, how-
ever, the dealership is able to sell the car that was subject to X's
contract to Buyer Y for $20,000, and Y takes delivery on the very
same day on which Buyer X was scheduled to do so. The dealer-
ship thus earned the $2000 in profit that it would have made if it
had sold the car to Buyer Y.
Notwithstanding X's assertion that the dealership suffered
no loss, in these facts the law is that X is liable to the dealership
for $2000 in accordance with U.C.C. section 2-708(2) because,
absent X's breach, the dealership would have made the sale to
Buyer X and would have sold a car to Buyer Y and thus earned a
total of $4000 in profit. X's breach caused it to lose $2000 of
59 Id.
60 Id. at *4.
61 Id. at *5.
62 Once again the court used the lost volume rationale but never used the term
"lost volume." However, that would have been somewhat appropriate in Aluminum
Distributors since ADI was not able to fully cover and therefore did in fact lose some
volume as a result of GARMCO's breach. Id.
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profit. 63 Thus X must pay the dealership $2000 in order to put
the dealer in as good a position as performance by X would have
done. 64
A. Application of the Lost-Volume Concept to Resellers and
Others
The logic underlying the result in the auto dealership hypo-
thetical has caused it to be applied both explicitly and implicitly
in a variety of situations where the non-breaching party is other
than a mere re-seller, i.e., to "a multitude of plaintiffs who are
neither lost volume sellers, nor jobbers, nor component sellers."65
For example, in the following hypothetical Professor Farnsworth
discusses the concept of lost volume in a context that is much
more akin to the circumstances of both Fertico and Aluminum
Distributors than is the automobile dealership example noted
above. 66 A builder contracts to build a building on an owner's
land for $100,000. The builder would have made a profit of
$10,000 by performing. However, the owner repudiates the con-
tract before any work or preparation is performed. The builder
promptly enters into another contract to build an identical build-
ing for $100,000 at a profit of $8000. The builder claims that he
has lost volume as a result of the breach, i.e., "had the first con-
tract not been broken, the builder could and would have made
both contracts."6 7 Professor Farnsworth indicates that not only
can the builder prevail on this assertion but also that the asser-
tion can also be successfully made by injured parties in other
commercial circumstances.
The same claim may be made by a manufacturer in similar cir-
cumstances, when manufacture of the goods is not begun,
63 For other cases and an excellent explanation of the "lost volume seller" situa-
tion, seeWHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 7-9, at 384-89.
64 A totally different result would, of course, have been reached if the transac-
tion were only a sale between two private parties. That is, the owner's complete ex-
pectation interest is fulfilled if after X's repudiation, he were able to resell the car to
Y at the same price in which case X would owe the owner nothing despite his clear
breach. Id. at 386.
65 Id. at 389; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at § 12.10, at 209-20.
66 FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.10, at 215.
67 Id. (citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347
cmt. f, Illustration 16 (1981) ("Unless it is proved that [the builder] would not have
undertaken both [obs], [the builder's] damages are based on the net profit he would
have made on the contract with [the owner], without regard to the subsequent
transaction.").
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or... by a seller of goods that has bought the goods for re-
sale... [and if the injured party] can show or the court will as-
sume that [he] could and would have expanded [his] business to
take both contracts and make [the] combined profit of $18,000,
but that as a result of the breach.., has only one contract (the
second one) on which the profit will be $8,000, [he] will be al-
lowed to recover $10,000 damages on the first contract, with no
subtraction for the profit made on the second contract.68
B. The Suggestion in Aluminum Distributors of a Better Way
To Determine if the Plaintiff Would Have Entered into the
Subsequent Transaction
As noted, the Restatement applies the above rule to any
commercial plaintiff provided that it could and would have en-
tered into the subsequent transaction even if there had been no
breach.69 Aluminum Distributors certainly did not disturb this
proposition. 70 It required the non-breaching party to demon-
strate that it could otherwise have purchased a sufficient quan-
tity of goods in time to enter into the transaction for which it
used the late-delivered goods. 71 However, Aluminum Distribu-
tors also suggests a better way to determine this, and thus
whether the plaintiff must disgorge the profits it made on the
late-delivered goods. 72 The answer to the ultimate question of
whether the non-breaching party would have entered into the
subsequent transaction, had there been no breach, is rarely
provable with absolute certainty. 73 In addition, any affirmative
testimony by the plaintiff is often looked upon by the court as be-
ing at least somewhat self serving.74 Therefore, Aluminum Dis-
tributors implicitly suggests that a better first step is to ask the
much more manageable question of whether the non-breaching
party was a regular volume dealer in the goods. 75 Where ques-
68 FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.10, at 215-16.
69 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. f (1981).
70 No. 87-C6477, 1989 WL 157515, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 1989). As discussed,
whether this analysis is really required in the case of a covering plaintiff is quite
another question. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
71 Id. at *5.
72 Id.
73 Indeed, it has been said that proving actual lost volume status is an almost
impossible burden. See WILLIAM H. HENNING ET AL., THE LAW OF SALES UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 8-18 (1981).
74 See id. at 8-17-8-18.
75 See Aluminum Distributors, 1989 WL 157515, at *5.
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tion is answered in the affirmative, provided that there is also a
showing that the plaintiff had the capacity and intention to per-
form both the initial transaction and the subsequent one,76 the
burden would then appropriately shift to the breaching party to
demonstrate "that it is more probable than not that the plaintiff
would not have had both sales... and thus that the second re-
sale profit ... should be used to reduce the plaintiffs recovery."77
The breaching party would likely try to do so by, among other
things, attempting to prove that the injured party, for some rea-
son, would not have acquired goods of the type under contract in
the time between the initial breach and the late delivery and
thus was able to enter into the subsequent transaction only be-
cause it accepted the late-delivered goods. It might also attempt
to demonstrate either that, after the breach, the non-breaching
party was operating at what was felt to be an optimum volume
and that the late-delivered goods merely caused that optimum
level to be exceeded or that the level of operations actually
achieved upon delivery of the late-delivered goods could not have
been reached but for the breach. 78 These arguments, however
speculative and difficult to prove, are substantially facilitated
where courts, albeit erroneously, have placed the total burden on
the injured party to prove that it could and would have had both
transactions if there had been no breach. 79
C. Application of the Regular-Dealer Concept to Plaintiffs Other
Than Middlemen
As noted, the court in Aluminum Distributors readily as-
sumed that, even without the breach, ADI, would have per-
formed both the initial transaction and the subsequent transac-
tion.8 o The Fertico majority did much the same thing.81 This
76 Hackley, supra note 4, at 216; cf. In re El Passo Refinery, L.P. v. UOP, 196
BR. 58, 66 (Bankr. W.D.Tex. 1996) (using a "decisional matrix" to decide if the in-
jured party had lost volume and suggesting that courts determine if the breach cre-
ated the opportunity for the second transaction). See generally Roy R. Anderson,
Damages for Sellers Under the Code's Profit Formula, 40 Sw. L.J. 1021, 1059 (1986).
77 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 6-3, at 298; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. f (1981); Anderson, supra note 76, at 1060; Hackley, supra
note 4, at 191.
78 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.10, at 218.
79 See id.
80 Aluminum Distributors, 1989 WL 157515, at *5.
81 See Fertico Belgium S.A. v. Phosphate Chemicals Export Ass'n, Inc., 70
N.Y.2d 76, 80-81, 510 N.E.2d 334, 336, 517 N.Y.S.2d 465, 467-68 (1987).
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assumption was not based on the plaintiffs role as a mere mid-
dleman.8 2 Indeed, a similar result would have been obtained by
a broad spectrum of plaintiffs.8 3 The only threshold requirement
is a demonstration that the party regularly dealt with significant
quantities of the goods, did a substantial amount of work of the
type in question, used a substantial volume of raw materials or
components of the type in issue to manufacture goods,8 4 or had
some other continuing involvement with the goods or work of the
type in issue.8 5
Take, for example, the situation of a manufacturer who
needs large quantities of certain relatively long-lead-time raw
materials to make a finished product, which it in turn sells to the
general public8 6 and the consequences of a breach by its raw ma-
terials supplier. Needless to say, it would be foolhardy for any
such manufacturer not to have entered into substantial raw ma-
82 Id., 510 N.E.2d at 336, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 467-68.
83 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981) (applying
the rule to all commercial plaintiffs).
84 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.11, at 220-24.
85 Id.
86 This circumstance is substantially similar to that of an assembler of the vari-
ous components discussed in WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 7-10, where the
supplier of one component breaches. In that instance the failure of the supplier has
caused the curtailment of planned or at least desired manufacturing. An important
difference is, however, that some assembly may have occurred even in the absence
of the component in question and partially completed units of some value may exist.
Where the primary raw material needed to run a production facility is not available
production stops or slows and no partially completed goods exist.
Assuming that there was nothing particularly unique about the raw material
that the seller was to provide, i.e., either it or raw material from other sources (if
available) could have been used to manufacture the buyer's finished product, would
the manufacturer's damages change if, instead of selling to the general public at
whatever the going market price was, the manufacturer had a contract to sell a
quantity of finished products to a third party at a fixed price but he was unable to
do so because of the supplier's breach? To the extent that other raw material was
not immediately available to produce the finished products for which the manufac-
turer had a contract, its initial lost opportunity and the minimum direct portion of
the resulting damages are quite clear. It is the profit lost on the sale of finished
goods, which could not be accomplished because of the lack of raw material. In this
regard, the situation is similar to the lost sales ADI experienced in Aluminum Dis-
tributors.
As to the implication of any subsequent delivery of the raw materials by the
breaching seller, the question would appear to be no different here than in Alumi-
num Distributors and for all of the reasons set forth above and discussed infra, the
Aluminum Distributors' approach as adjusted by the corollaries set forth infra in
Part III, would seem to be fully applicable. Indeed, in this example, the late-
delivered raw materials would simply be used to meet other requirements that the
manufacturer had.
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terial supply contracts well before the date of planned manufac-
ture. Though such foresight would indeed be prudent, the mere
existence of such contracts does not guarantee that the supplier
will not breach them or that cover at anything less than a high
price can quickly remedy the ensuing failure of supply.
In such circumstances, where the manufacturer effectuates
cover and can show that, had there been no breach, it had both
the desire and the manufacturing capacity to produce the fin-
ished products that it made with the cover goods and the fin-
ished products it made in the appropriate subsequent period
from the late-delivered goods, the manufacturer is entitled to its
increased cost of cover and, absent more, the profits that it made
on the finished goods manufactured from the late-delivered
goods.8 7 Indeed, such a remedy should be applied pursuant to
the very broad provisions of U.C.C. section 2-714(1), Buyer's
Damages for Breach in Regard to Accepted Goods. This provi-
sion permits the injured party to "recover as damages for any
non-conformity of tender the loss resulting in the ordinary course
of events from the seller's breach as determined in any manner
which is reasonable" and in turn encompasses the lost volume
concept88 contained in U.C.C. section 2-708(2)89 or as such rem-
edy may be applied pursuant to common law.90 In either event,
87 See discussion supra at footnotes 76-77 and accompanying text regarding
the showings necessary to shift the burden to the breaching party of showing that,
in the absence of the breach, the injured party would not have accomplished both
the initially planned transaction involving the goods and the transaction that was
subsequently occurred using the late-delivered goods.
88 U.C.C. § 2-714(1) (2003) (emphasis added). In this regard, Professors White
and Summers make reference to the extreme case of a manufacturer who ceases
production as a result of a supplier's breach as exemplifying a party that has lost
volume. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 7-11, at 392. The same would, however,
be true where the manufacturer only produces less as a result of the supplier's
breach.
89 U.C.C. § 2-708(2) states in pertinent part:
If the [difference between the market price at the time and place of tender
and the unpaid contract price together with any incidental damages] is in-
adequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have
done then the measure of damages is the profit (including reasonable over-
head) which the seller would have made from full performance by the
buyer, together with any incidental damages ....
Id.
90 24 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 64:28, at
200 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2002). Because the cover remedy was not designed
for accepting buyers, one commentator has construed the code's permission in
U.C.C. section 2-714(1) to determine damages in these circumstance- s:r. arv.'rer
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profits made on transactions based on the late-delivered goods
need not be deducted from the injured party's damages. Indeed,
so long as the transaction involving the late delivered goods was
neither a substitute for one that would have been accomplished
had there been no breach 9' or a bonus, that is, one which would
not have been accomplished had there been no breach, 92 the prof-
its made on the subsequent transaction need not be applied in
whole or in part to offset damages otherwise due the non-
breaching party. 93
D. Why the Transaction Involving the Late-Delivered Goods Is
Not Simply a Substitute, a Bonus, or Other Child of the
Breach
The fact that the late-delivery need not be viewed as a sub-
stitute can be seen by reference to the hypothetical set out in the
Introduction in which the supplier failed to make timely delivery
of twenty tons of raw materials-the amount the non-breaching
party used in its factory each week. If by the time that delivery
is finally possible and accomplished some weeks or maybe
months later, the manufacturer did or could have purchased the
twenty tons for that week's needs, and perhaps the ensuing few
reasonable as a requirement that the injured party prove that rejection of the goods
and revocation of the contract was not possible. Hackley, supra note 4, at 223. This
position ignores the fact that under U.C.C. section 2-708(2) both cover costs and ad-
ditional damages could be awarded if cover alone were inadequate to put the injured
party in as good a position as performance would have done. See WHITE & SUM-
MERS, supra note 2, § 6-3, at 298. Hackley does, however, indicate that a reasonable
justification for accepting the late-delivered goods could be to ensure that the in-
jured party had an adequate volume of goods to continue performance at or near ca-
pacity. Hackley, supra note 4, at 223-24.
The amount of plaintiffs damages would be measured by the market price of
the finished goods at the time that manufacture would have taken place but for the
breach.
91 See discussion supra note 45 for an explanation of substitute transactions.
92 A bonus transaction would be exemplified as follows: Q, not a regular dealer,
contracts to sell goods to a third party. However, its supplier breaches its contract
and fails to deliver. Q secures cover and thus completes the transaction with the
third party. Thereafter, the supplier makes delivery. Q, who never had any inten-
tion to sell any additional goods of this type, sells the late-delivered goods to a
fourth party. The transaction between Q and the fourth party is a bonus that would
not have occurred but for the breach. Accordingly, the breaching supplier can use
the profits that Q made on that transaction to offset any damages otherwise pay-
able.
93 See discussion of substitution supra note 45, pointing out that a finding that
the subsequent transaction was a substitution "generally results in a smaller recov-
ery by the injured party."
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weeks', from other available sources, no substitution would be
involved and the manufacturer need not reduce the damages
otherwise due it by the profits that it made in transactions in-
volving the late-delivered twenty tons.94 That is, for purposes of
determining damages due the injured party that obtained cover,
the question is whether it is more likely than not that even with-
out the late-delivered goods the factory would still have been
able to operate at the same level of production that it did in the
period immediately after acceptance of the late-delivered goods. 95
As noted previously, for a regular purchaser of such raw materi-
als the presumption is that, even without the late-delivered
goods, it would have secured sufficient material to maintain op-
erations at the same level, the late-delivery was not a bonus and,
as Professors White and Summers aptly describe it, the transac-
tion involving the late-delivered goods was not "a child of the
breach"96 requiring that the profits therefrom be offset against
damages otherwise due the non-breaching party.
E. The Applicability of U. C. C. Sections 2- 714(1) and 2- 708 in
the Absence of Cover: Back to the Lost- Volume Situation
The applicability of U.C.C. sections 2-714(1) and 2-708 and
the common law certainly would not change if, in the current
hypothetical, the manufacturer was not able to obtain cover at
commercially reasonable prices, and the manufacturer was
therefore suing for lost profits on finished products that could
not be produced because of the supplier's breach. 97 Indeed, on
these facts there would appear to be little doubt that an oppor-
tunity was missed by virtue of the seller's breach and that the
manufacturer is entitled to the profits that it would have made
by producing the finished product from the raw materials which
the supplier failed to supply and, absent more, the profits that it
made in the subsequent production and sale of finished goods. 98
As noted, there is little distinction between the situations in
Fertico, Aluminum Distributors, and that of the manufacturer
94 Cf. discussion supra note 45 (explaining when a substitution transaction is
involved).
95 As set forth supra in note 6 and the accompanying text, where cover was not
obtainable at commercially reasonable prices, the additional inquiry is a determina-
tion of what production was lost as a result of the breach.
96 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 6-3, at 298.
97 See discussion supra note 90.
98 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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that is unable to cover in the above hypothetical. The fact that
the compensation sought in the named cases was the increased
cost of cover while the manufacturer in the hypothetical is seek-
ing lost profits is of no moment. In fact, part of what ADI sought
and recovered in Aluminum Distributors was lost profits. 99
Moreover, while cover damages are more commonly awarded, the
fact that lost profits are awarded in commercial cases where
cover is not obtainable is not surprising since the increased cost
of cover in reality merely represents the decrease in the profits
that the non-breaching party made in its subsequent transaction
because it had to use higher cost goods than it had anticipated.100
The question over which the majority and the dissent argued
so vehemently in Fertico was at its root simply the issue of
whether or not Fertico was a volume buyer and seller of fertil-
izer.10 1 This issue would have been no different if Phoschem's
breach had, in turn, prevented Fertico from fulfilling its contract
with Altaweed and thus Fertico had sued for lost profits. 10 2 The
dissent would have said, just as in the hypothetical set out in
note 64 supra, regarding a private owner's reselling his car for
$X after the original party repudiated a contract for the same
price, that the profit on the subsequent transaction should be
used to offset the loss on the first. On the other hand, the Fertico
majority would insist that but for Phoschem's breach, Fertico, as
a regular dealer in fertilizer, would have made the subsequent
sale to Janssens irrespective of Phoschem's performance after
the breach. That is, in the ensuing months, with or without
Phoschem's performance, Fertico would have secured sufficient
fertilizer to enter into the subsequent transaction with Janssens.
The court in Aluminum Distributors, of course, would have
agreed with the Fertico majority because it too was of the view
that, where dealers in goods are involved, post-breach perform-
99 Aluminum Distributors, Inc. v. Gulf Aluminum Rolling Mill Co., No. 87 C
6477, 1989 WL 157515, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 1989).
100 See David Frisch & John. D. Wladis, Uniform Commercial Code; General
Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 43 BUS. LAW. 1259, 1293
(1988).
101 See Fertico Belgium S.A. v. Phosphate Chemicals Exp. Ass'n, 70 N.Y.2d 76,
82-84, 87-88, 510 N.E.2d 334, 337-38, 340-41, 517 N.Y.S.2d 465, 468-69, 471-72
(1987) (stating majority and dissenting positions as to whether Fertico was a vol-
ume buyer and seller).
102 See WILLISTON, supra note 90, § 64:19, at 162-63; see also 11 ARTHUR LIN-
TON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1022, at 116, 119 (1979).
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ance by the breaching party resulting in profits to the dealer
equal to or even greater than those that would have been
achieved had there been no breach do not, in and of themselves,
eliminate the damages of a lost volume dealer. 10 3
The damages recoverable by the hypothetical manufacturer
would thus seem to turn on whether it is viewed as a volume
buyer/processor of the raw material. If viewed in this light, as
both Fertico and Aluminum Distributors suggest and as dis-
cussed supra, there is at least a rebuttable presumption, taking
into account necessary lead times for the manufacturer's post-
breach acquisition of raw materials, that its production of fin-
ished products in the subsequent period would have been the
same irrespective of its supplier's belated performance. 10 4 Such a
rebuttable presumption is entirely consistent with the observa-
tion of Professors White and Summers that the outcome in Fer-
tico is a proper one unless the breaching party can show by a
preponderance of the evidence that, had the supplier not
breached, the non-breaching party would not have produced any
more finished products than it did produce at or about the time
of the breach and that without the belatedly supplied raw mate-
rial it would not have produced as much finished product as it
did in the subsequent period when late delivery was made. 10 5
Unless raw materials at commercially reasonable prices are
nearly impossible to obtain from any source or sources at any
time during the period between the supplier's breach and its be-
lated performance, the task of the breaching supplier is to dem-
onstrate that it is more reasonable than not that the manufac-
turer could not have produced as much without the supplier's
late delivery. This is an extremely difficult task. This task is, of
course, made even more difficult when the lag time between the
breach and the belated performance is significant, and the
manufacturer has had a long time to overcome the hole in its
pipeline created by the breach and by the need to discount any
103 See Aluminum Distributors, 1989 WL 157515, at *4-5.
104 See Allied Semi-Conductors Int'l, Ltd. v. Pulsar Components Int'l, Inc., 907
F. Supp. 618, 631 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (reversing the lower court holding in Fertico be-
cause Fertico would have pursued the sale even if the original contract had been
fully performed); WILLISTON, supra note 90, § 64:28, at 202 (stating that although it
is sometimes assumed that the injured party would have undertaken a new transac-
tion, that is a question of fact that must be examined in each case).
105 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 6-3, at 298.
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impairment of the non-breaching party's financial situation
caused by the breach. 106
III. THE ALUMINUM DISTRIBUTORS APPROACH To DEALING
WITH ANY REAL OR PERCEIVED WINDFALL TO THE
NON-BREACHING PARTY
Subsequent to Fertico, Aluminum Distributors indicated
that an aggrieved buyer who accepts late-delivered goods should
be entitled to its breach damages as in Fertico.10 7 The court also
suggested that Fertico should be limited so as to permit the non-
breaching party to retain the profits from the transaction involv-
ing the late-delivered goods, in addition to its breach damages,
only to the extent that the buyer can demonstrate that, at the
time of late delivery, an identical quantity of similar goods was
available from another seller at the same price as the late-
delivered goods.108 As both Aluminum Distributors and the
commentators indicated, to the extent that the non-breaching
party obtained the advantage of goods that were priced below the
current market at the time that they were delivered, however be-
latedly, the breaching party should be allowed to offset the
amount received in excess of any which would otherwise have
been realized at the time of anticipated performance, against the
damages owed as a result of its breach. 10 9 In Aluminum Dis-
tributors, this special benefit was measured by the difference be-
tween the market price at which ADI could have purchased alu-
106 That is, it is important to remember that what is being examined here is
what would have occurred in the absence of the breach, namely, what other raw ma-
terials could have been obtained in the absence of the breach by a subsequent date,
that is, in the period between the date of the breach and the date of late delivery. In
such an analysis, any negative financial consequences to the non-breaching party
caused by the breach must, by definition, be treated as if they never occurred. On
the contrary, the financial condition of the non-breaching party needs to be viewed
as if there was no breach and that it made whatever profits it would have and been
in the financial position that it would have been in had there been no breach.
107 Aluminum Distributors, 1989 WL 157515, at *5.
108 Id.
109 Id.; see also David W. Barnes, The Net Expectation Interest in Contract Dam-
ages, 48 EMORY L.J. 1137, 1205 (1999) (recognizing both the basic correctness of the
Fertico approach and a need for the courts to adjust any benefit obtained by the in-
jured party from a subsequent transaction involving the late-delivered goods so as
to take into account the improvement in the non-breaching party's well-being result-
ing from the transaction); Frisch & Wladis, supra note 100; Hackley, supra note 4,
at 200, 219.
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minum at the time of the late delivery and the price in the
GARMCO contract. 110
More specifically, in Aluminum Distributors, the court
agreed with GARMCO and the dissent in Fertico that, because
ADI had accepted the aluminum, it could not recover its cover
damages under U.C.C. sections 2-711 and 2-712."1 As comment
1 to section 2-711 specifically states, the cover remedy available
in sections 2-711 and 2-712 applies only to a buyer who has not
accepted the goods or "who has justifiably revoked his accep-
tance."" 2 However, the court did concur with the Fertico major-
ity in holding that ADI was entitled to its cover costs under
U.C.C. section 2-714(1) which, although rarely utilized,1 3 spe-
cifically deals with the situation where the buyer has accepted
110 Aluminum Distributors, 1989 WL 157515, at *5.
111 Id. at *4; see also U.C.C. § 2-711 (2003). That section, entitled "Buyer's
Remedies in General; Buyer's Security Interest in Rejected Goods" provides, in rele-
vant part:
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery ... then with respect to any
goods involved, and with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the
whole contract.. . the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so
may in addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to all the goods af-
fected whether or not they have been identified to the contract ....
Id. U.C.C. section 2-712, " 'Cover;' Buyer's Procurement of Substitute Goods," pro-
vides:
(1) After a breach within the preceding section the buyer may "cover" by
making in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable pur-
chase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from
the seller.
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference be-
tween the cost of cover and the contract price together with any incidental
or consequential damages as hereinafter defined (Section 2-715), but less
expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach.
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not bar him
from any other remedy.
U.C.C. § 2-712.
112 See Aluminum Distributors, 1989 WL 157515, at *4; Fertico Belgium S.A. v.
Phosphate Chemicals Exp. Ass'n, 70 N.Y.2d 76, 85-86, 510 N.E.2d 334, 339-40, 517
N.Y.S.2d 465, 470-71 (1987). Comment 1 to U.C.C. section 2-711 states that the
remedies listed in section 2-711 "are those available to a buyer who has not accepted
the goods or who has justifiably revoked his acceptance. The remedies available to a
buyer with regard to goods finally accepted appear in the section dealing with
breach in regard to accepted goods." U.C.C. § 2-711, cmt. 1 (emphasis added). The
Fertico majority apparently ignored this comment and improperly relied in part on
U.C.C. sections 2-711 and 2-712 in holding that Fertico was entitled to its cover
costs. Fertico, 70 N.Y.2d at 81-83, 510 N.E.2d at 336-37, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
113 Roy Ryden Anderson, Buyer's Damages For Breach in Regard to Accepted
Goods, 57 MISs. L.J. 317, 329 (1987).
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the goods. 114 The Aluminum Distributors court did so because it
found that "GARMCO clearly knew that ADI had purchased the
aluminum for resale and that the late deliveries would render
ADI in breach of its contracts with third parties and require it to
cover or lose the sales."115 Because section 2-714(1) specifically
deals with the situation where acceptance has occurred, unlike
the plaintiff in Fertico, in order to be awarded damages, ADI was
not required to demonstrate the existence of circumstances that
virtually compelled it to accept the late-delivered goods. 116 The
court also held that section 2-714(1) entitled ADI to the profits it
lost on planned resales that were canceled as a result of
GARMCO's delays. 117
Quite significantly, the court further concluded that
GARMCO could offset profits that ADI made on the resale of the
late-delivered aluminum against damages but only to the extent
that ADI failed to prove that it received no market-related bene-
fit by obtaining and reselling the late-delivered goods,
We further find that GARMCO may not offset against these
[cover and lost profit] damages ADI's profits on the resale of the
late-delivered aluminum as costs saved due to the breach,
unless ADI fails to prove that it could otherwise have pur-
chased similar aluminum for resale and hence would neverthe-
less have made these additional sales.... [I]f GARMCO can
show that the price of the aluminum ADI would otherwise have
purchased to make these additional sales would have been
higher than the price ADI paid GARMCO for the aluminum,
this difference in price may be deducted from the damages
GARMCO owes ADI, as profits ADI would not have earned but
for GARMCO's breach.
114 See U.C.C. § 2-714(1).
115 Aluminum Distributors, 1989 WL 157515, at *5. As previously noted, U.C.C.
section 2-714(1) provides that "[w]here the buyer has accepted goods and given noti-
fication ... he may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the loss re-
sulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as determined in
any manner which is reasonable." U.C.C. § 2-714(1) (emphasis added). Although, as
stated above, the Fertico majority improperly relied on U.C.C. sections 2-711 and 2-
712, they also held that "[t]he loss resulting to Fertico by having to acquire cover,
even in the face of its acceptance of a late-delivered portion of the fertilizer, is prop-
erly recoverable under section 2-714(1)." Fertico, 70 N.Y.2d at 84, 510 N.E.2d at 338,
517 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
116 See Aluminum Distributors, 1989 WL 157515, at *4-5.
117 Id. at *5.
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... ADI is entitled to keep any profits it made on the late-
delivered aluminum so long as it proves it could otherwise have
obtained comparable aluminum to fill those sales at comparable
prices. GARMCO is entitled to offset from the above damages
any decrease in profits ADI would have received if it had can-
celed delivery of the late-delivered aluminum and has instead
made the fourth party sales from aluminum purchased from
other sources. Such damages will place ADI in the same posi-
tion as if GARMCO had not breached. 118
The commentators that recognized the appropriateness of
the Fertico approach with the addition of such a market-related
limitation did so in order to ensure general adherence to the
principle that the aggrieved party should not be placed in a bet-
ter position than it would have been in had there been no
breach. 119 In this regard, it should be noted that in attempting
118 Id. In this passage the court described any special benefit two ways: first as
the "difference in price" between the price that ADI would otherwise have had to
pay for aluminum in order to make the additional sales and its contract price with
GARMCO and thereafter as "any decrease in profits ADI would have received if it
had cancelled delivery of the late-delivered [GARMCO] aluminum and.., instead
made the fourth party sale from aluminum purchased from other sources." Id. While
the later reference to "decrease in profits" might seem to open the door to calculat-
ing those decreased profits by taking into account items such as an increased cost of
labor, increased overhead, etc. in a later period (an approach not without some
merit) the court, despite using seemingly different ways to describe the special
benefit, really appears focused solely on any benefit created by a difference in the
price of aluminum at the time of GARMCO's late delivery and the price set forth in
the ADI's contract with GARMCO. Id.
119 For example, Frisch and Wladis concluded in their August 1988 survey of
U.C.C. decisions that:
Both the majority and dissenting opinions [in Fertico] seem a bit wide of
the mark. First, there is nothing inherently improper in permitting the re-
covery of cover damages when the goods have been accepted. If Fertico had
not covered when it did, Phosphate would have had to compensate it for
the entire profit lost on its contract with Altaweed. In effect, cover dam-
ages in this case represent no more than a portion of that profit lost be-
cause of an increase in the acquisition cost of the fertilizer sold to Al-
taweed. First, the majority erred in blindly accepting the fact that Fertico
would have made the sale even without Phosphate's fertilizer. Second, as-
suming that sale could have been made, the profit received would depend
on the then market price of fertilizer. In a rising market, to give Fertico
the full profit on the sale of the fertilizer purchased from Phosphate is, in-
deed, to give it more than it would have earned from full performance of
the Phosphate contract.
Frisch & Wladis, supra note 100, at 1293. Hackley notes:
From an economic standpoint, there may be situations where a middleman
should be allowed to keep resale profits from late-delivered goods and re-
cover a portion of the increased cost of replacement goods. If, for example,
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to do so in Aluminum Distributors, the court indicated that the
breaching party may have been entitled to an offset if it could
demonstrate that the price of the late-delivered goods was more
favorable than goods which the non-breaching party would oth-
erwise have purchased. In that case, "this difference in price
may be deducted from the damages [the breaching party] owes
[the non-breaching party], as profits [that the non-breaching
party] would not have earned but for [the] breach."'120
The basic soundness of Aluminum Distributors' acceptance
of the Fertico approach with the addition of a market related
limitation can be demonstrated by the following illustrations, the
first of which assumes that the aluminum market remained sta-
ble between T1, when the parties entered into their contract, and
T2, when late delivery was actually made or, in the absence of
any breach, ADI otherwise would have obtained goods for the
subsequent transaction. 121 These illustrations show that, with
some adjustments, the Aluminum Distributors' approach prop-
erly takes into account the difference in the plaintiffs economic
status at the end of all relevant transactions and the economic
status that it would have enjoyed in the absence of the breach,
what White & Summers describe as "[t]he real question."'122
A. Case 1: Stable Market Conditions: The Validation of Fertico
As the following illustration indicates, in a generally stable
market, reduction of the damages owed the injured party (ADI)
a middleman normally buys goods in a stable long-term market, he might
prove that a replacement purchase on the spot market made necessary by
a late delivery was more costly than a purchase normally would have been
on the long-term market. In other words, although a middleman might
have two profitable resales notwithstanding a late delivery, he might show
that his total profit from the two transactions was reduced because he had
to pay more for a quick purchase to replace the late-delivered goods, and
that had there been no breach, the purchase necessary to fulfill a second
resale would have been less costly on a long-term market.
Hackley, supra note 4, at 224-25.
120 Aluminum Distributors, 1989 WL 157515, at *5.
121 As discussed infra, while basically sound, the Aluminum Distributors ap-
proach to calculating the special market benefit by which a breaching party may
offset the damages otherwise due the injured party is, however, in need of refine-
ment particularly where the factual situation is more complex than in Case 1, e.g.,
in situations involving highly fluctuating markets. See infra Part III, Cases 2a and
2b.
122 White & Summers, supra note 2, § 6-3, at 298 (discussing what the outcome
should have been in Fertico).
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(here the increased cost of cover caused by having to purchase on
the spot market, that is, the difference between the cost of cover
($525) and the contract price ($500)), by the profits ($100) that
ADI made when it sold the late-delivered goods at $600 would
result in ADI being considerably worse-off than had there been
no breach.
(A) No BREAcH
TI: GARMCO's Timely Delivery and ADI's T2: ADI's Subsequent Purchase
Resale Thereof and Resale
Wholesale market $500 Wholesale market $500
price: price:
GARMCO/ADI con- $500 Subsequent pur- $500
tract price: chase price:
Resale market price: $600 Resale market price: $600
ADI resale price: $600 ADI resale price: $600
ADI profit: $100 ADI profit: $100
ADI's total profit: $200 ($100+$100)
(B) BREACH
TI: GARMCO Breach/ADI Cover T2: GARMCO's Late Delivery/
Purchase ADI's Resale of the Cover Goods ADI's Resale of the Late-
delivered Goods
Wholesale market $500 Wholesale market $500
price: price:
GARMCO/ADI $500 GARMCO/ADI con- $500
contract price: tract price:
"Spot" purchase/ $525123* **
cover price:
Resale market price: $600 Resale market price: $600
ADI resale price: $600 ADI resale price: $600
ADI profit: $75 ADI profit: $100
ADI's total profit: $175 ($75+$100)
123 It is also assumed that, in order to cover for GARMCO's late delivery, ADI
had to make a quick purchase in the "spot" market and thus paid a premium of $25
above market value in order to obtain readily-deliverable goods.
White and Summers suggest that a buyer that continually makes purchases should
not be able to select the most expensive purchase as the one purchased as cover un-
der section 2-712(1), but should rather be limited to the average cost of the goods
purchased in the relevant period. Id. at 302. This may, however, be unfair to plain-
tiffs, such as manufacturers that lack unlimited capacity, and as such, absent the
breach, may very well not have purchased the most expensive of the goods. Thus the
highest priced goods may quite likely have been the ones that were purchased to fill
the hole in the plaintiffs pipeline caused by the seller's breach. Moreover, even Pro-
fessors White and Summers acknowledge that, "it seems unlikely that a buyer in
reliance upon the outcome of an always uncertain law suit will spend more than
necessary to cover." Id.
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Obviously, in this illustration, ADI's recovery of the in-
creased cost of cover ($25), the profit that it made on the resale
of the cover goods ($75), and its retention of the profits on the re-
sale of the late-delivered goods ($100), are all necessary to place
ADI in as good a position as it would have been in had GARMCO
fully performed in which case, as can be seen in (a), its total
profit would have been $200. If ADI's increased cost of cover
were offset by the $100 profit that it made on the resale of the
late-delivered goods, ADI would only make a total profit of
$100,124 whereas in the absence of the breach it would have made
$200.
Under the "simplified 'cover' formula" discussed supra in
Part I, the result is the same. All that need be done is for the
breaching party to pay the non-breaching party $25, that is, the
amount by which the cost of 'cover' ($525) exceeds the wholesale
market price: at the time of the late-delivery ($500), assuming
that this is the date on which, in the absence of the breach, ADI
would have gone into the wholesale market to purchase goods for
the subsequent transaction. By augmenting the $175 that ADI
made from the transactions, ADI's total profit would be $200,
that is, the amount that it would have made absent the breach.
GARMCO would, however, try to argue that the resale was a
bonus transaction, that is, one that came about in addition to all
of the ones that the non-breaching party otherwise would have
made at or about the time of the late-delivered goods and thus
that ADI got a windfall from the sale of the late-delivered goods
in the form of extra profits. When the profit on the bonus trans-
action ($100) is netted against the increased cost of cover ($25),
GARMCO would assert that ADI made an additional $75 in
profit as a result of the breach.
(A) No BREACH
Ti: GARMCO's Timely Delivery and ADI's Re- T2: ADI's Subsequent Purchase
sale Thereof: and Resale:
GARMCO's cost of $375
Material:
Wholesale market price: $500 Wholesale $500
market price:
124 $175 as indicated in (b) above
plus $25 for the increased cost of cover
less $100 for the profits on the resale of the late-delivered goods
$100
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GARMCO/ADI contract $500 Subsequent purchase $500
price: price:
Resale market price: $600 Resale market price: $600
ADI resale price: $600 ADI resale price: $600
ADI profit: $100 ADI profit: $100
GARMCO profit: $125"********_
ADI's total profit: $200 ($100 + $100)
(GARMCO's profit: $125)
(B) BREACH
TI: GARMCO Breach/ADI Cover T2: ADI's Subsequent
Purchase Goods: Resale of the Cover:
Wholesale market price: $500 Wholesale $500
market price:
GARMCO/ADI contract $500 Subsequent purchase price: $500
price:
"Spot" purchase/cover $525****
price:
Resale market price: $600 Resale market price: $600
ADI resale price: $600 ADI resale price: $600
ADI profit: $75 ADI profit: $100
T3: GARMCO's Late Delivery and ADI's
Resale Thereof:
GARMCO's cost of $375
Material:
Wholesale market price: $500
GARMCO/ADI contract price: $500125
Resale market price: $600
ADI resale price: $600
ADI profit: $100
GARMCO profit: $125
ADI's total profit: $275 ($75+$100+$100)
(GARMCO's profit: $125)
GARMCO would thus contend that: (1) by virtue of the sub-
sequent transaction involving the late-delivered goods, ADI had
already benefited by the breach. That is, having made a total
profit of $275 as compared to the profit of only $200 that it would
have made had there been no breach and (2) if it had to pay ADI
another $25 for the increased cost of cover, in order for ADI to be
in the same position as it would have been had there been no
breach, ADI must disgorge the profit ($100) which it made on the
resale of the late-delivered goods, or at least $25 of it, equaling
the damages that GARMCO is being called upon to pay.
However, GARMCO's argument is flawed. Complying with
GARMCO's wishes would result in a violation of the rule that so
125 It is assumed that, under the contract between GARMCO and ADI, the price
of the aluminum was fixed and thus stayed constant during the rising market.
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long as the transaction involving the late-delivered goods was
neither a substitute for one that would have been accomplished
had there been no breach or a bonus, that is, one which would
not have been accomplished had there been no breach, the prof-
its made on the subsequent transaction need not be applied in
whole or in part to offset damages otherwise due the non-
breaching party. 126 Moreover, by offsetting ADI's damages in the
amount of the profits it made on the subsequent non-
substitute/non-bonus transaction involving the late-delivered
goods, GARMCO, despite its breach, would be relieved of any ob-
ligation to pay damages, while ADI, as a volume dealer, would
have to absorb the increased cost of cover. Under this scenario,
solely because of the profit that ADI made on a transaction that
it would have entered irrespective of any dealings with
GARMCO, GARMCO would wind up making the same profit for
having breached the contract ($125)127 that it would have made
had it performed in accordance with the contract ($125).
When assessing the damages owed to ADI in this situation,
one must take into consideration the fact that there is no basis to
justify GARMCO's benefiting from its own breach and that such
damage formulas are only used in an attempt to approximate the
profit that the injured party would have made. Additionally, one
must take into account that as between the injured party and
the breaching party, where there is a windfall of some sort com-
ing out of the calculation of damages, of which there is none in
the illustration, the law tends to favor the injured party. 128 Each
of these propositions support the appropriateness of the basic
Aluminum Distributors' approach and no reduction of the dam-
ages owed ADI in this instance.
126 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
127 $125 (profits from the contract itself)
less $25 (payment to ADI for the increased cost of cover)
plus $100 (the amount of profit on the resale of the late-delivered goods that
ADI disgoraed)
$200
128 See discussion supra note 37. In this regard Professors White and Summers
also recognize the approximate nature of such remedies under the U.C.C., wherein
they note that "[section] 2-712 will overcompensate an occasional buyer because, for
example, the seller will be unable to prove that the buyer specifically benefited from
the added quality of the cover" and that reducing damages based on the plaintiffs
post-breach behavior will "enrich an occasional seller." WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 2, §§ 6-3, 6-4, at 304, 320.
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B. Case 2: Rising Market Conditions: The Validation of
Aluminum Distributors
What the court in Aluminum Distributors did, and the court
in Fertico failed to do, was to take into account the fact that be-
tween the date of the breach and the date of the late delivery,
the wholesale price of the goods had increased. 129 As the two il-
lustrations below involving such a situation indicate, offsetting
the increased market value of the late-delivered goods from
damages otherwise due, as the court did in Aluminum Distribu-
tors, is generally appropriate. In this regard, it should be noted
that no offset was made of any profits that ADI earned on the
transaction, a transaction that the court recognized ADI would
have entered irrespective of any late-delivered goods. Rather,
the offset was accomplished pursuant to the directive of U.C.C.
section 2-714(1), which calls for the calculation of damages in a
reasonable manner, and through the court's recognition that
GARMCO delivered goods to ADI that were more valuable at the
time of delivery than the fixed price that ADI had paid for them.
The first illustration below demonstrates that, in a con-
stantly increasing market the late delivery of fixed-priced goods
caused ADI to receive goods for which, if bought at the time of
late delivery, it would have had to pay more on the wholesale
market. That is, if instead of accomplishing the subsequent
transaction with the late-delivered goods, the price of which was
$500, ADI had used goods available on the wholesale market, its
cost would have been greater. In the example, ADI would have
paid $525 rather than the contract price of $500. It follows then
that ADI's traditional damages should be offset by this increased
special market benefit.
(A) No BREACH
TI: GARMCO's Timely Delivery: T2: ADI's Subsequent Purchase:
Wholesale market $500 Wholesale market $525
price: price:
GARMCO/ADI $500 Subsequent purchase $525
contract price: price:
Retail market $600 Retail market price: $625
price: I I 1 _ 1
129 As discussed supra note 1199, Fertico was substantially criticized for allud-
ing to, but failing to deal with, an increase in the wholesale price of fertilizer.
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ADI retail price: $600 ADI retail price: $625
ADI profit: $100 ADI profit: $100
ADI's total profit: $200 ($100+$100)
(B) BREACH
Ti: GARMCO Breach/ADI Cover T2: GARMCO's Late Delivery:
Purchase:
Wholesale market $500 Wholesale market $525
price: price:
GARMCO/ADI: $500 GARMCO/ADI: $500
contract price: contract price:
"Spot" purchase/ $525130.***
cover price:
Resale market $600 Resale market price: $625
price:
ADI resale price: $600 ADI resale price: $625
ADI profit: $75 ADI profit: $125
ADI's total profit: $200 ($75 +125) --- 1
As part (b) of the illustration shows, if ADI were permitted
to recover its cover damages ($25), the difference between the
contract price and the spot market price of cover, and retain all
of the profits made on the resale of the late-delivered aluminum
from GARMCO, it would make a total profit of $225, $200 from
the transactions plus $25 in damages, and would have been
placed in a better position than if GARMCO had fully performed,
in which case ADI's profit would only have been $200.13i Accord-
ingly, in this situation, 132 the holding in Aluminum Distributors
would permit GARMCO to offset the market-related benefit that
ADI obtained as a result of the breach ($25) against ADI's cover
130 It is again assumed that, in order to cover for GARMCO's late delivery, ADI
had to make a quick purchase in the "spot" market and, thus, paid a premium of
$25 above market value. See Aluminum Distrib., Inc. v. Gulf Aluminum Rolling Mill
Co., No. 87 C 6477, 1989 WL 157515, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 1989) (alluding to the
fact that the cover market price of aluminum had risen).
131 This also bears out the thesis that "[i]f... the [non-breaching party] resells
the goods at a higher price than the market price on the date of tender [set forth in
the contract], 2-708(1) overcompensates." WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 7-11,
at 390. Of course, a market adjustment per Aluminum Distributors, although not
discussed by the professors, would obviate the benefit derived from a rising market.
132 Unlike the situation described infra in Part III, assuming that the delay be-
tween T1 and T2 in this instance was not great, it would not require discounting of
any special market benefit that the non-breaching party gained as a result of the
late delivery.
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damages ($25). In the above example, ADI would not recover
anything from GARMCO. 133
The simplified cover formula, which calls for the payment of
damages equal to the amount by which the cover price exceeds
the wholesale price of the goods on the date that the injured
party would have gone into the market and bought substitute
goods for the late delivered goods, reaches the same result as the
Aluminum Distributors approach used above. That is, applying
the formula in the above illustration would call for GARMCO to
pay ADI the difference between $525, the cover price, and $525,
the wholesale price on goods on the date of the late delivery, 134
that is, nothing.
It must be reiterated that this result is permissible, whereas
the offset that GARMCO sought in Case 1 is not, because here no
offset is being made of any profits that ADI earned on the trans-
action that ADI would have entered irrespective of any late-
delivered goods. Rather, the offset was accomplished solely be-
cause the late-delivered goods delivered to ADI were cheaper
than goods which ADI could otherwise have purchased to enter
into that transaction.
The dissent in Fertico argued that the mere possibility of the
buyer reaping a "windfall,"13 5 such as the above illustration indi-
cates is possible without an Aluminum Distributors adjustment,
is sufficient to demonstrate that the basic approach adopted by
the majority in Fertico and continued in Aluminum Distributors
is flawed:
[A] buyer who must go into the market to obtain goods will or-
dinarily not be able to rely on the availability of a "standard
price"; rather, unlike the seller who has an unlimited supply of
133 Of course, under the Aluminum Distributors approach, in the situation
where cover was not effectuated, the non-breaching party's damages would be the
profit that it lost on the transaction that was not accomplished, reduced by any dif-
ference between the wholesale price of goods on the date of the late delivery and the
contract price. Aluminum Distributors, 1989 WL 157515, at *5.
134 At least presumptively, the date of late-delivery is also the date on which
the injured party would have gone into the market to secure goods for the subse-
quent transaction. However, where, as in Fertico, the late-delivered goods were held
several months before resale, this presumption would appear inapplicable and a
date more consistent with the normal lead-time between the securing of goods in the
wholesale market and reselling them should apply. See generally Frisch & Wladis,
supra note 100, at 1292-96 (discussing the limitations of buyers' remedies).
135 Fertico Belgium S.A. v. Phosphate Chemicals Exp. Ass'n, 70 N.Y.2d 76, 86,
510 N.E.2d 334, 339, 517 N.Y.S.2d 465, 471 (1987) (Titone, J., dissenting).
[Vol.78:131
PROFITS FROM LATE-DELIVERED GOODS
standard-price goods in its inventory, the reselling buyer re-
mains at the mercy of the wholesale market's price fluctuations.
Because of these differences, it cannot "be safely assumed" that
the aggrieved buyer-dealer would have made a second sale at a
particular profit were it not for the seller's breach. To the con-
trary, the occurrence of and profit on a second transaction
would depend on such other, unrelated variables as the avail-
ability and wholesale market price of the goods at the time the
buyer-dealer went into the market to acquire them. Thus, the
rationale for the seller-dealer's lost-profit remedy is simply in-
applicable to buyer-dealers.
... [W]hile a second sale may have been theoretically possible
even without the breach, the uncertainties occasioned by the
buyer/seller's need to return to the marketplace for more goods
of the same kind preclude the assumption, implicit in the ma-
jority's holding, that the second sale and its accompanying
profit would have been made on the same terms even if no
breach had occurred. 136
This position is echoed by some who assert:
The Code specifically provides for the seller to recover lost prof-
its where no other remedy is effective. No similar remedy is
provided for a buyer. A seller can recover lost profits in the
situation where the seller has, if not an unlimited supply of the
goods, at least the ability to fulfill two contracts. Here, Fertico
did not have an unlimited supply of goods. As a buyer Fertico
would normally have to go into the market to purchase goods
for a second deal. Because it appears from the case that the
price of fertilizer was increasing, that second purchase arguably
would have been at a higher price. By allowing Fertico to keep
the profit, Fertico received more on the second transaction than
it would have otherwise, thereby reaping a windfall because of
the breach.137
This view is, however, unduly harsh. Indeed, there is no
need for the courts to be so punitive as to totally deprive a non-
breaching party of the profits of the subsequent transaction
when, in most cases, either a simple adjustment for any special
market-related benefit obtained by virtue of an upward move-
ment of the market between T1, when the goods were originally
contracted for, and T2, when they were actually delivered, or the
136 Id. at 88-89, 510 N.E.2d at 340-41, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 472 (Titone, J., dissent-
ing) (citations omitted).
137 Donnelly & Donnelly, supra note 39, at 182-83 (citations omitted).
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application of the simplified cover formula can easily obviate any
such windfall.138
While both the Aluminum Distributors approach and the
simplified cover formula work very well in the above illustration,
in the real world, escalation in the market price of goods fre-
quently occurs, albeit not uniformly, between the date on which
the contract is signed and the date on which delivery is required
as well as between this original delivery date and the date of
late-delivery. Moreover, rises in wholesale prices and retail
prices do not always track exactly. As a result, some fine-tuning
of these damage formulations is needed for such circumstances.
1. Case 2a: Rising-but-Fluctuating Market: The Aluminum
Distributors Corollaries
As the illustration in Case 2a below demonstrates, rote ap-
plication of the Aluminum Distributors approach can, in certain
circumstances, leave the injured party in a worse position than
had no breach occurred, that is, with total profits of only $210139
as compared to profits, absent the breach, of $220. For this rea-
son, as explained below, the amount of any offset must be limited
so that it: (a) does not exceed the amount by which the market
value of the goods on the date of late-delivery exceeds the market
value of the goods on the date that delivery should have occurred
and (b) cannot be so large as to put the non-breaching party in a
worse position than it would have been absent the breach. In
fact, irrespective of the size of the offset, the non-breaching party
cannot be put in a worse position than had there been no breach.
No BREACH
Ti: Date of GARMCO/ADI Contract:
Wholesale market price on date of breach: $500
GARMCO/ADI contract price: $500
T3: GARMCO's Timely Delivery/ADI's Resale:
Wholesale market price: $530
GARMCO/ADI contract price: $500
Resale market price: $620
138 As discussed infra in Part III, even in non-volatile markets, in some in-
stances there may, however, be a need to discount the amount of change in the
market so as to factor out the length of time between Ti and T2.
139 See infra note 141.
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ADI resale price: $620
ADI profit: $120
T4: ADI's Subsequent Purchase of Aluminum and Resale Thereof:
Wholesale market price: $555
Subsequent purchase price: $555
Resale market price: $655
ADI resale price: $655
ADI profit: $100
ADI's total profit: $220 ($120+$100)
(B) BREACH
TI: Date of GARMCO/ADI Contract:
Wholesale market price on date of breach: $0
GARMCO/ADI contract price- $500
T2: GARMCO Breach/ADI Cover Purchase:
Wholesale market price on date of breach: $510
GARMCO/ADI contract price: $500
"Spot" purchase/cover price: $535
Resale market price: $610
ADI resale price: $610
ADI profit: $ 75
T3: DATE ON WHICH GARMCO SHOULD HAVE DELIVERED:
Wholesale market price: $530
T4: GARMCO's Late Delivery /ADI's Resale of the Late-delivered Aluminum:
Wholesale market price: $555
GARMCO/ADI contract price: $500****
Resale market price: $655
ADI resale price: $655
ADI profit: $155
ADI's total profit: $230 ($75 +155)
In this illustration, if ADI were allowed to recover its tradi-
tional cover damages of $35 ($535-$500) and retain all of the
profits it made on the resale of the late-delivered aluminum, it
would make a total profit of $265 ($230+$35). This would admit-
tedly place ADI in a better position than if GARMCO had not
breached because in the latter case, ADI's total profit would only
have been $220. Application of the Aluminum Distributors ap-
proach would, however, reduce the damages that GARMCO has
to pay to ADI by $55, that is, the difference between the contract
price ($500) and the aluminum wholesale price at the time of
late delivery ($555). However, such application ignores the fact
2004]
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that (a) some of the increase in market value may have inured to
ADI's benefit even if there had been no breach 140 and that (b) by
rotely following the Aluminum Distributors' formula, ADI's total
profit would only be $210,141 which is $10 less than it would have
been had GARMCO not breached. Ignoring these facts is inap-
propriate. To avoid doing so, the Aluminum Distributors for-
mula needs to be supplemented with the following three corollar-
ies. First, the maximum amount of any potential offset should
be calculated by the amount by which the wholesale market
price on the date of late delivery ($555) exceeds the wholesale
market price on the date performance should have occurred
($530), rather than the difference between the wholesale market
price on the date of late delivery and the contract price. This
change yields a better measure of the benefit that ADI got from
the late delivery. 142 Second, the amount of any offset must be
further limited, if necessary, so that the non-breaching party is
never put in worse a position than had there been no breach.
Third, irrespective of the limitation of any offset, the non-
breaching party must never be left in a place that is worse than
the position in which it would have been absent the breach.
140 That is, on the date when delivery was scheduled, the wholesale value of
aluminum had increased, as had ADI's potential for profits in the rising retail mar-
ket for aluminum. The latter is true unless the particular aluminum was already
the subject of a resale contract prior to the date of anticipated delivery. Had there
been no breach, ADI would have sold the aluminum at or near the peak of the mar-
ket.
141 $230
plus $ 35 increased cost of cover ($535-500)
less $ 55 wholesale market price at time of delivery less contract price ($555-500)
$210
142 See Frisch & Wladis, supra note 100, at 1293-94. This would also be consis-
tent with the authorities cited supra in note 37, indicating that where there is an
unanticipated benefit that flows from the breach, all other things being equal, eq-
uity favors the non-breaching party retaining the benefit.
Doing so would be consistent with the remedy provided in U.C.C. section 2-714
for acceptance of non-conforming goods: "the difference at the time and place of ac-
ceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have
had if they had been as warranted [i.e., delivered on time]." U.C.C. § 2-714(2)
(2003).
Where, as in Fertico, the late-delivered goods were held for several months be-
fore resale, the presumption that the date of late-delivery would also be the date
upon which the non-breaching party would have gone into the market to buy substi-
tute goods to accomplish the subsequent transaction would appear inapplicable and
a date more consistent with the normal lead-time between securing goods on the
wholesale market and reselling them should apply. See supra note 1344.
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Applying these corollaries to the above illustration, the
maximum potential offset would be $25 ($555), wholesale value
of the goods when late-delivery is made, less $530, wholesale
value of goods when delivery should have been made. Offsetting
this amount from the damages that GARMCO would otherwise
have had to pay ($35) would make GARMCO responsible for pay-
ing damages in the amount of $10 and ADI's total profit would
be $240. Since the latter amount is more than the $220 that ADI
would have earned absent the breach, nothing further is re-
quired.143
Under the simplified cover formula, GARMCO would be re-
quired to pay ADI the amount by which the increased cost of
cover ($535) exceeds the market value of the goods on the date of
actual delivery ($555). Since, in this case, the increased cost of
cover did not exceed the market value of the goods on the date of
actual delivery, GARMCO would not owe ADI anything and
ADI's total profit would only be $230.
2. Case 2b: Alternative Illustration of Rising-but-Fluctuating
Market: The Aluminum Distributors Corollaries
The viability of these corollaries is further demonstrated in
the Case 2b illustration, which again attempts to portray the
real world situation of ever-fluctuating wholesale and retail
markets for goods. The illustration also demonstrates how the
Aluminum Distributors approach, used in conjunction with the
suggested corollaries, fares in those circumstances. As the illus-
tration shows, the application of Aluminum Distributors and its
corollaries results in the breaching party not having to pay any
breach damages and the non-breaching party making a slightly
higher total profit than it would have made absent the breach.
No BREACH
TI: Date of GARMCO/ADI Contract:
Wholesale market price on date of breach: $500
GARMCO/ADI contract price:] $500
T3: GARMCO's Timely Delivery/ADI's Resale:
Wholesale market price: $525
143 For a discussion of the approximate nature of such a damage formula and
why the injured party and not the breaching party should be the one to be benefited,
see discussion supra note 37.
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GARMCO ADI contract price: $500
Resale market price: $680
ADI resale price: $680
ADI profit: $185
T4: ADIs Subsequent Purchase of Aluminum and Resale Thereof.
Wholesale market price: $540
Subsequent purchase price: $540
Resale market price: $655
ADI resale price: $655
ADI profit: $115
ADI's total profit: $300 ($185+$115)
(B) BREACH
Date of GARMCO /ADI Contract:
Wholesale market price on date of breach: $500
GARMCO /ADI contract price: $500
T2:- GARMCO Breach /ADI Cover Purchase:
Wholesale market price on date of breach: $510
GARMCO /ADI contract price: $500
"Spot "purchase /cover price: $535
Resale market price: $610
ADI resale price: $610
ADIprofit: $ 75
T3: DATE ON WHICH GARMCO SHOULD HAVE DELIVERED:
Wholesale market price: $535
Resale market price: $680
T4: GARMCO's Late DeliveryADI Resale of Late-delivered Aluminum:
Wholesale market price: $540
GARMCO/ADI contract price: $500****
Resale market price: $655
ADI resale price: $655
ADIprofit: $115
ADI's total profit: $190 ($75+$115)
Under the Aluminum Distributors approach (a), the cover
damages due ADI would be $25144 reduced by the amount, if any,
that the market value of the goods at the time of late delivery
($540) exceeds the contract price ($500). Accordingly, pursuant
144 $525 (spot market price)
less $500 (contract price)
$25
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to this approach, GARMCO would not owe ADI anything, and
ADI's total profit would remain $190. Needless to say, this
would result in ADI profiting considerably less than it would in
absence of the breach.
In applying the above corollaries to the Aluminum Distribu-
tors approach in the Case 2b illustration-because the wholesale
market price of the goods at the time of the late delivery ($540)
exceeded the market value at the time delivery should have oc-
curred ($535)-the maximum potential offset against cover costs
would be $5. This would result in cover damages being reduced
from $25 to $20 and a total net profit to ADI of $210 ($190+$20),
which is $90 less than the $300 it would have made had there
been no breach. As such, the corollaries would require that
GARMCO pay an additional $90 so as to put ADI in the same
position as it would have been absent the breach, that is, ADI's
total profit would be $300 ($190 plus the cost of cover ($25) less
the offset ($5) plus the additional amount GARMCO would have
pay to equalize ADI's position ($90)). GARMCO would, thus,
have to pay ADI a total of $110.
The simplified cover formula, on the other hand, would re-
quire GARMCO to pay the amount, if any, by which the cost of
cover ($525) exceeded the wholesale market price at the time
that ADI would have entered the market to purchase fertilizer
($540), discounted if and as needed. Here that amount would be
$0. Accordingly, under the simplified cover formula, ADI's total
profit would be $190. Since this is considerably less than the
profit ADI would have made absent the breach, the corollary re-
storing the non-breaching party to the position in which it would
have been absent the breach clearly must be applied. Therefore,
GARMCO would have to pay $110, the same amount of payment
it would have made under the approach in the preceding para-
graph.
C. Case 3: Falling Markets
Where the going market price for the goods declines at or af-
ter the time of contracting, generally the buyer is well advised to
reject the goods and to purchase substitutes elsewhere at lower
prices. Not surprisingly, in such circumstances, it is advanta-
geous for the breaching party to deliver the goods, albeit later
than prescribed, at a contract price that is higher than the
breaching party could then sell them in the market place. The
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above notwithstanding, rejection of the goods by the buyer may
still not be provident in some circumstances, for instance, where
goods of a similar quality are not readily obtainable. Additional
examples include situations involving federal contracts contain-
ing clauses that, at least ostensibly, require the buyer to con-
tinue contract performance despite what appears to be a breach
of contract by the governmental seller 145 or other situations in
which the buyer/middleman may do itself more harm by cancel-
ing the contract. 146 In the latter situations, whether or not cover
has been effectuated, "if the buyer has an immediate need for the
contracted goods, for example to supply a resale customer, good
business practice, as well as the duty to mitigate [any incidental
or consequential] damages, may require him to accept the defi-
cient tender,"' 47 and seek his damages by offset against the con-
tract price or otherwise. 148 Indeed, acceptance of the goods is
also entirely appropriate where the buyer is a constant pur-
chaser of such goods for the purpose of supplying the operations
of its manufacturing facility. 149
145 Indeed, because the federal government believes the buyer cannot reject the
late-delivered goods, it also believes that it remains obligated to provide the goods
even after very substantial delays.
146 See, e.g., Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp. 245, 250
(N.D. Ill. 1974) (holding that it was not necessary for Chemetron to cancel its con-
tract for the delivery of liquid oxygen and/or nitrogen in order to sue for damages
relating to McLouth's spotty contract performance, because if it had done so,
"Chemetron would ... have been in an even worse position and less able to serve its
customers if it had received no product at all from McLouth"), affid, 522 F.2d 469
(7th Cir. 1975); cf. Hackley, supra note 4, at 219.
147 Anderson, supra note 113, at 328-29. Indeed, "[s]ometimes the exigencies of
the market necessitate further dealings between [the parties]" which could encom-
pass the acceptance of the late-delivered goods. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, §
6-3, at 303.
In Aluminum Distributors, the court concluded that GARMCO clearly knew that
ADI had purchased the aluminum for resale and consequently, ADI need not prove
that acceptance of the late-delivered goods was reasonable. See supra note 1155 and
accompanying text.
148 See Anderson, supra note 113, at 329. That said, it has been argued that, in
order to avoid the offset of profits made on the transaction subsequent to receipt of
the late-delivered goods against cover damages (or profits lost on a forgone transac-
tion), the buyer/middleman should have to demonstrate that: (1) the acceptance of
the late-delivered goods was reasonable and (2) there was a loss of profit despite the
acceptance and use/resale of the late-delivered goods. Hackley, supra note 4, at 223-
24.
149 This can also be explained, at least in part, by the fact that in a falling mar-
ket acceptance of the goods at a later time does not put the late-delivering seller in
any worse position than he would otherwise be if the buyer rejected the goods and
he had to sell them on the open market.
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1. Case 3a: Falling Market/No Effect on Spot Market Price
(A) No BREACH
TI: GARMCO's Timely Delivery and ADI's T2: ADI's Subsequent Purchase
Resale: and Resale Thereof
Wholesale market $500 Wholesale market price: $475
price:
GARMCO/ADI $500 Subsequent purchase $475
contract price: price:
Resale market price: $600 Resale market price: $575
ADI resale price: $600 ADI resale price: $575
ADI profit: $100 ADI profit: $100
ADI's total profit: $200
($100+$100)
(B) BREACH
TI: GARMCO Breach/ADI Cover Pur- T2: GARMCO's Late Delivery
chase ADI's Resale of the Cover Goods: ADI's Resale of the Late-
delivered Goods:
Wholesale market $500 Wholesale market price: $475
price:
GARMCO sale price: $500 GARMCO sale price: $500
"Spot"purchase/cover $525150 ****
price:
Resale market price: $600 Resale market price: $575
ADI resale price: $600 ADI resale price: $575
ADI profit: $75 ADI profit: $75
ADI's total profit: $150 ($ 75+$ 75)
In this situation, ADI should be compensated for the in-
creased cost of cover ($25). However, this is not enough to place
ADI in as good a position as it would have been had GARMCO
fully performed. That is, even with that payment, ADI is still
short $25 as a result of the decrease in market price. Indeed, if
GARMCO had not breached and ADI had purchased aluminum
on the wholesale market for the T2 sale, ADI would have saved
150 This example assumes that the falling market would not affect the "spot
market" price. This assumption is premised on the spot purchase being made during
T1, the period during which the contract was entered into and the delivery was sup-
posed to have arrived.
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$25. Accordingly, GARMCO would have to pay ADI the sum of
$50.
Since it did not have reason to do so, the court did not ad-
dress the issue of a falling market in Aluminum Distributors. If,
however, in the above example, GARMCO is allowed to offset the
amount of any market benefit against damages otherwise due, it
makes sense that it should also have to compensate ADI for any
market loss, particularly where doing so would put ADI in as
good of a position as it would have been had there been no
breach. Therefore, GARMCO should have to pay the $25 for
cover plus the $25 profit loss ADI incurred as a consequence of
having to resell the late-delivered goods in a falling market.
The same result is achieved under the simplified formula.
Here, the amount by which cost of cover ($525) exceeded the
wholesale market price at the time that ADI would have entered
the market to purchase aluminum for delivery to its second cus-
tomer ($475) is the amount due ADI from GARMCO. Indeed,
GARMCO's payment of $50 would increase ADI's total profit on
the transactions from $150 to $200, the amount that it would
have made in the absence of any breach.
2. Case 3b: Falling Market/Lower Spot Market Price
The Case 3a illustration is premised on the idea that the fal-
ling market did not affect the spot market purchase. The possi-
bility of this fact depends largely on how soon the spot purchase
is made to cover after the contract price is set. In a situation like
Fertico, where only a few weeks separated the two events, it is
possible that the market conditions would not have changed
much. However, if the spot purchase was made six months later
to cover GARMCO's breach (assuming that the delivery date was
not until six months after the contract was entered), it is very
likely that the spot market price would also have been affected
by the falling market price. In such a scenario, it is even possi-
ble that the spot purchase would cost less than the original
GARMCO sale price. ADI would, therefore, receive a benefit in
the sense that the cost to cover would be less than the original
sale price. However, the falling market would also affect the re-
sale price of the late-delivered goods, and ADI may still need
compensation for this loss in order to be placed in as good a posi-
tion as it would have been had there been no breach. The follow-
ing example clarifies this point:
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(A) No BREACH
Ti: GARMCO's Timely Delivery and ADI's T2: ADI's Subsequent Pur-
Resale: chase and Resale Thereof:
Wholesale market $500 Wholesale market $475
price: price:
GARMCO/ADI con- $500 Subsequent purchase $475
tract price: price:
Resale market price: $600 Resale market price: $575
ADI resale price: $600 ADI resale price: $575
ADI profit: $100 ADI profit: $100
ADI's total profit: $200 ($100+$100)
(B) BREACH
Ti: GARMCO Breach/ADI Cover Purchase T2: GARMCO's Late Delivery/
ADI's Resale of the Cover Goods ADI's: Resale of the Late-
delivered Goods
Wholesale market $500 Wholesale market $475
price: price:
GARMCO sale price: $500 GARMCO sale price: $500
"Spot" purchase/cover $500151 ****
price:
Resale market price: $600 Resale market price: $575
ADI resale price: $600 ADI resale price: $575
ADI profit: $100 ADI profit: $75
ADI's total profit: $175 ($100+$75) 1
In this illustration, the cost of cover was the same as the
original contract price; however, the falling market caused ADI
to lose $25 on the resale of the late-delivered goods. In order to
place ADI in as good of a position as it would have been had
GARMCO not breached, ADI should be able to recover this lost
$25 as well. Nevertheless, a court may be reluctant to make
such a liberal interpretation of Aluminum Distributors because
the cost of cover is a wash. However, failing to do so would be an
error.
Indeed, Aluminum Distributors can be interpreted as requir-
ing an analysis of the specific market-based facts for the transac-
151 Premised on a $475 price based on the falling market plus a $25 premium
since the purchase was from the spot market.
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tion at issue. 152 In Aluminum Distributors, the court performed
this analysis to determine whether ADI received a market bene-
fit.153 The Case 3a and 3b illustrations merely expand this the-
ory to determine whether ADI would incur a market loss if there
were a falling market. This fact specific approach could be very
helpful in recovering lost profits from a breaching seller. How-
ever, it is also possible that courts will avoid such a detailed in-
quiry for fear of getting bogged down or of treading in waters too
remote from the breach.
IV. IS THE ALUMINUM DISTRIBUTORS APPROACH TOO FAVORABLE
TO A BREACHING SELLER? SOME ADDITIONAL FACTORS
THAT NEED TO BE CONSIDERED
It is true that unlimited application of Fertico can, as noted
above, deliver a windfall to the buyer in a rising market. On the
other hand, the dissent in Fertico advocated an approach that
would simply bar all buyers from recovering cover damages in
the event of late-delivery. In sum, the approach set forth in
Aluminum Distributors greatly tempers any potential windfall.
Under Aluminum Distributors, the non-breaching buyer should
be awarded cover damages and/or lost profits and be permitted
to retain its full profit from the resale of the late-delivered goods,
except to the extent that it can be shown that it received a direct
market-related benefit as a result of the breach.
As fair as the basic Aluminum Distributors approach gener-
ally is, it does not respond to the question of why the breaching
party should get any benefit from fortuitous post-breach in-
creases in the market for the goods that it failed to deliver. This
is particularly true in light of the rule discussed in detail earlier
in this Article that, so long as the transaction involving the late-
delivered goods was neither a substitute for one that would have
been accomplished had there been no breach or bonus, the prof-
its made on the subsequent transaction need not be applied in
152 See Aluminum Distrib., Inc. v. Gulf Aluminum Rolling Mill Co., No. 87 C
6477, 1989 WL 157515, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 1989) (holding that reasonably
calculated damages include the cost of covering and lost profits as long as the buyer
can prove it could have covered).
153 Id. at *5 (requiring GARMCO to show that the price of the aluminum that
ADI would have purchased to cover would have been higher than the price paid to
GARMCO in order to offset damages as a result of a market benefit).
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whole or in part to offset damages otherwise due to the non-
breaching party.
Professors White and Summers raise, but reject, the possi-
bility that the drafters of U.C.C. section 2-708 believed that
plaintiffs, in general, were too little rewarded and that breaches
were undeterred. However, the professors assert that if this was
the drafters' philosophy, then it is conceivable that they regarded
some sections of the U.C.C., for example, section 2-708(1), as liq-
uidated damage clauses available to the plaintiff irrespective of
its actual damage. 154 They note that such a position is, however,
inconsistent with the philosophy stated in section 1-106 and
comment 1 thereto which indicates that: "compensatory damages
are limited to compensation. They do not include consequential
or special damages, or penal damages; and the Act elsewhere
makes it clear that damages must be minimized."'155
The remedy created in Aluminum Distributors does not,
however, conflict with the above rule. Indeed, it does not seek to
directly diminish any profit that ADI made as a result of a boom-
ing resale market for aluminum. Rather, consistent with the di-
rection of section 2-714(1) to determine damages in a manner
which is reasonable, 156 it simply comports with the reality that
the value of the goods themselves had, through neither party's
efforts or fault, simply changed by the time that the late-delivery
occurred and indicates a belief that this change in value should
be taken into consideration in calculating damages. This is par-
ticularly true where doing so would simply help keep the ag-
154 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 395 (discussing why lost profits are of-
ten appropriate for buyers).
155 Id. (citing U.C.C. § 1-106, cmt. 1 (2002)). As Professor Farnsworth puts it,
No matter how reprehensible the breach, damages are generally limited to
those required to compensate the injured party for lost expectation, for it is
a fundamental tenet of the law of contract remedies that an injured party
should not be put in a better position than had the contract been per-
formed.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.8, at 193 (citations omitted). The seemingly invio-
late "fundamental tenet" was, however, rejected by the Federal Circuit in LaSalle
Talman Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 317 F.3d 1363, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2003), in
favor of the considerably narrower view of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
section 347, comment e, which urges a reduction in the damages payable to the non-
breaching party only when the non-breaching party "makes an especially favorable
substitute transaction." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. e (1981)
(emphasis added).
156 See Aluminum Distributors, 1989 WL 157515, at *4-5 (holding that the
court must grant ADI damages which are otherwise reasonable).
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grieved party from being placed in a substantially better position
than it would have been in had a breach not occurred.
Moreover, another reason why the breaching party's dam-
ages should be affected by the market into which the late-
delivered goods were interjected lies in the fact that once the
breach occurred and the seller became liable for the increased
cost of cover and/or profits lost as a result of the non-delivery, he
still made the late-delivery to the buyer. This was probably done
in the hope of avoiding liability for any damages, when in reality
the breach had already relieved him of his duty to provide the
goods. Had he recognized this, in a rising market, instead of de-
livering the goods to the buyer at the price set in the contract, he
could and would have sold them on the open market at a higher
price. Thus, he would have benefited from the market to the
same extent that the buyer ultimately did and to which the
breaching seller had every right to do as well.157
157 This can be seen in the following comparison showing the benefit that the
breaching seller gave up by virtue of making the late-delivery in a rising market:
GARMCO Breach/No Late Delivery to GARMCO BreachlWith Late Delivery
ADI: to ADI:
GARMCO's sale price to $500 GARMCO's sale price to $500
ADI: ADI:
GARMCO's price to other $575 Market value at time of late $575
buyer at T2: delivery:
GARMCO's cost of material: $375 GARMCO's cost of material: $375
GARMCO's profit from sale: $200 GARMCO's profit from sale $125
to ADI:
Damages owed to ADI: ($100) Damages owed to ADI: ($100)
Net to GARMCO: $100 Net GARMCO: $25
Conversely, in a ueclinng markbel, a breacing sel er uelivering bie goouds ate
avoided losses that it would have suffered if it had been forced to sell the goods at
the current market price rather than at contract price. This is a reason why the
seller should be liable for any additional losses which the buyer incurs in a subse-
quent transaction involving the late-delivered goods. See the example below.
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To compensate the breaching party, or rather, to ensure that
damage awards do not under-compensate the non-breaching
party by permitting the breaching party too great an offset and
the plaintiff too little a recovery, two things need to be done.
First, courts applying the holding in Aluminum Distributors
must be sure that the special benefit obtained by the non-
breaching party would not have been obtained, neither in whole
nor in part, absent the breach. Second, to the extent any special
benefit is derived as a result of the breach after a significantly
lengthy amount of time, the amount of the special benefit should
be discounted so as to value it as of the time when delivery
would have occurred but for the breach.
The first point noted immediately above is illustrated by the
following example of a situation where the alleged special benefit
could have been obtained even if there had been no breach: A
company in the business of producing and selling crushed rock
secures the right from a land owner to remove all of the rock
from a specified pit at any time during a three-year period at a
fixed price per ton. The company is, however, thereafter pre-
cluded by the landowner from commencing and completing op-
erations when, in year two of the contract, it desired to remove
the rock. Assuming, (1) that the company covered at the same
price as in the contract but thereafter the wholesale price of rock
increased dramatically and (2), that in year three the landowner
permitted the company to remove the rock, should the special
benefit of getting below-market price rock in year three be used
to offset the damages for which the landowner is liable to the
crushing company? 158 While a strict reading of Aluminum Dis-
GARMCO Breach/ No Late Delivery at GARMCO/With Late Delivery at T2:
T2:
GARMCO's sale price to ADI $500 GARMCO's sale price to ADI: $500
GARMCO's price to another $475 Market value at time of late $475
at T2 delivery:
GARMCO's cost of material: $375 GARMCO's cost of material: $375
GARMCO's profit from resale: $100 GARMCO's profit from sale $125
to ADI:
Cover damages/lost profit: ($100) Cover damages/ lost profit: ($100)
owed ADI: owed ADI:
Net cost or benefit to $0 Net cost or benefit to $25
GARMCO: GARMCO:
158 For the reasons noted supra in the text accompanying note 46, if the com-
pany had not been able to cover, the answer to the above question would clearly be
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tributors would suggest that the answer is "yes," it can be argued
that doing so would overly benefit the breaching party and not
properly compensate the non-breaching party. Unlike a simple
supply contract involving only a few deliveries, the breaching
party in this hypothetical, by entering into a long-term fixed
price contract, had ceded all rights to any increase in market
value of the rock to the buyer for a three-year period. Indeed,
that was a right for which the crushing company had paid. Un-
der the original contract, the crushing company had the right to
perform and reap the benefit of the market at any time during
the term of the contract. Thus, giving the landowner a credit for
such market increase could very well be viewed as giving away
something to which the buyer was entitled by contract. 159 On the
other hand, for the reasons noted above, the owner's material
breach obliged him to stop performance and, after the breach,
and the accruing of liability, the owner could have sold the rock
to a third party at a higher price. 160
With regard to the need to discount the value of any special
benefit, if for no other reason than that it came into existence at
a time that differs from when the breach damages were incurred,
using the undiscounted value of the benefit at the time of belated
delivery in the future as an offset against damages will allow
the breaching party to unduly benefit from its breach and result
in a substantial under-compensation of the non-breaching
buyer. 161 That is, in order to properly deduct any special benefit
from the non-breaching party's damages, the effect of the differ-
ence in time when each item was incurred needs to be factored
out. This can be done in one of two ways. The first is adding the
time value of money for the period between the breach and the
late delivery to the non-breaching party's damages. Thus, the
"no" because the company would have lost volume.
159 Under this thesis, an offset would also be inappropriate if the contract indi-
cated that its term would be extended in the event of any delay by the landowner,
causing performance to occur in year four (i.e., at a time still within the contempla-
tion of the original contract). The basis for denying this offset would again be that
the increase in market price occurred at a time during which the contract indicated
that the crushing company was entitled to the benefits of any such increase.
160 This factor arguably should not be applied in the case of those federal con-
tracts where the government believes the buyer cannot reject the late-delivered
goods and in turn believes that it remains obliged to provide the goods even after
very substantial delays.
161 See ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS,
§ 9.2 at 530-31(4th ed 1992).
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net amount due the non-breaching party would equal the present
net value of the damages incurred as of the date of the late de-
livery less any special benefit:
Net amount due = Damages incurred 162 X(1+r)tl63-the special bene-
fit
This formula can also be restated more simply as: the net
amount due the non-breaching party is the damages incurred
less the value of any special benefit discounted for the period be-
tween the non-breaching party's incurring the damages and the
date of the special benefit:
Net amount due = Damages incurred - the special benefit / (1+r)t
CONCLUSION
Most of the criticism of Fertico is misplaced. Particularly
misplaced is the criticism stemming from a reading of Fertico
that calls for the reduction or elimination of any compensation to
a commercial dealer who, despite a breach by a critical supplier,
makes a profit on the subsequent transactions involving any
late-delivered goods. Both the law and the economics of the
situation bode otherwise. Where the breaching party was aware
of the non-breaching party's intention to resell the goods or use
them to produce finished goods, the injured party need not dem-
onstrate the existence of circumstances that virtually compel it
to accept the late-delivered goods. Moreover, an Aluminum Dis-
tributors-type adjustment can easily obviate any windfall that
the injured party would otherwise obtain because of a rise in the
market value of the goods and consequent receipt of late-
delivered goods at a price that is below their then-current mar-
ket price.
This is not to say that the Fertico/Aluminum Distributors
approach is applicable to every circumstance. Indeed, it is not
162 The lost profits or increased cost of cover due to the breach.
163 "r" is the applicable rate of interest, that is, the higher of the rate of interest
on outstanding borrowings by the non-breaching party or the reasonable rate of re-
turn that the buyer could have made on the money. Both are usually a function of
the prime rate. The highest rate is used because it is reasonably assumed that the
non-breaching party would have availed itself of the highest rate either by paying
down a high rate loan or investing in a secure investment, thus yielding a high rate
of return.
"t" is the time between the non-breaching party's incurring the damages (nor-
mally the time of the breach) and the date of the special benefit (the date of late de-
livery).
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likely to be applicable to short delays in delivery unless the delay
results in damage to the non-breaching party. However, where
applicable, these cases find that a regular dealer need not prove
with nearly absolute certainty that it would have entered into
the subsequent transaction involving the goods even in the ab-
sence of the breach. In other words, a dealer need not show that
it lost volume. Rather, once a showing is made that the injured
party is a regular dealer that had the capacity and intention to
perform both the initial transaction and the subsequent one, ir-
respective of the late-delivered goods, the burden shifts to the
breaching party to prove that the subsequent transaction would
not have occurred but for the breach and without regard to any
negative financial consequences caused by the breach.
Moreover, the pure Aluminum Distributors-type adjustment
to exclude any special, market-related benefit that the non-
breaching party acquired is not itself appropriate in every in-
stance. Indeed, as described above, individual circumstances
may require that the basic Aluminum Distributors approach be
slightly adjusted by applying one or more of the following corol-
laries:
1. The contract must be examined closely to see if any special
benefit caused by market changes between the anticipated and
actual dates of delivery were already allocated to the non-
breaching party.
2. The maximum amount of any potential offset against dam-
ages otherwise due to the non-breaching party should be calcu-
lated by the difference between the wholesale market price of
the goods on the date of late delivery and the wholesale market
price of the goods on the date performance should have oc-
curred.
3. Where there is a significant amount of time between the
date of delivery set out in the contract (or otherwise antici-
pated) and the date of actual delivery, any special benefit
caused by market shifts should be appropriately discounted.
4. Under no circumstances should the breaching party ever put
the non-breaching party in a worse position than had there
been no breach.
5. If there is a "windfall," as between the non-breaching party
and one who has breached its contract, the law favors the non-
breaching party.
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